Report No. DODIG-2025-091

~~CUI~~

INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

MAY 2, 2025

(U) Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises

~~Controlled by: DoD OIG~~
~~Controlled by: Evaluations~~
~~CUI Category: OPSEC~~
~~Distribution/Dissemination Control: FEDCON~~
~~POC: Program Director,~~ [redacted]

INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

~~CUI~~


INSPECTOR GENERAL
INTEGRITY
EFFICIENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises

May 2, 2025

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to assess the DoD's capabilities to effectively carry out joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations and exercises.

(U) Background

(U) The DoD's JLOTS capability allows the DoD to deliver cargo in areas where fixed-port facilities are not available. The DoD recently employed JLOTS in Gaza to provide humanitarian aid as part of Operation Neptune Solace. To conduct JLOTS operations and exercises, the DoD uses specialized watercraft and equipment, such as temporary docks and piers, to transfer cargo from ship to shore.

(U) Both the Army and Navy maintain uniquely trained units with specialized watercraft and equipment to perform the JLOTS missions. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) oversees and coordinates logistics distribution efforts across the DoD's deployment and distribution enterprise, including JLOTS.

(U) Finding

(U) We concluded that the DoD possessed the capability to conduct JLOTS operations and exercises, but reductions in capacity resulted in challenges to effectively perform these missions. Specifically, the Army and Navy did not meet Service-level standards for equipment and unit readiness, nor did they organize, train, and equip their forces to meet common joint standards, known as joint mission essential tasks

(U) Finding (cont'd)

(U) for JLOTS. Additionally, we concluded that the Army and Navy JLOTS equipment was not interoperable and that planners at the geographic combatant commands did not fully consider mission-specific information requirements when developing their operational plans involving JLOTS.

(U) These conditions occurred because:

- (U) the Army and Navy did not allocate sufficient maintenance, manning, training, and procurement resources to their JLOTS units; and
- (U) USTRANSCOM did not fully exercise its authority under DoD Instruction 5158.06 to assist in establishing joint mission standards, interoperability requirements, and minimum planning elements for JLOTS operations and exercises.

(U) As a result, the DoD faces potential challenges meeting JLOTS requirements in fast-paced, contested, or simultaneous regional or global operations.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that Army and Navy headquarters review their Service-specific JLOTS units and make recommendations to their Service Secretaries to improve Army and Navy readiness, capacity, and resiliency to conduct JLOTS effectively. We also recommend that USTRANSCOM develop and implement a plan to meet requirements in DoD Instruction 5158.06 to establish joint mission standards, interoperability requirements, and minimum planning elements for JLOTS operations and exercises.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) Army and Navy officials agreed with our recommendations, and those recommendations are resolved but open. We will close the recommendations when we receive copies of the reviews that the Army and Navy agreed to conduct, along with recommendations to their Service secretaries.

(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises

(U) Management Comments (cont'd)

(U) The USTRANSCOM Deputy Commander, responding for the Commander, partially agreed with three recommendations and disagreed with a fourth recommendation. The Deputy Commander did not propose actions to meet the intent of the recommendations they partially agreed with; therefore, all four recommendations remain unresolved.

(U) We request that the USTRANSCOM Commander provide additional comments to the final report for all unresolved recommendations.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page and the transmittal memorandum for instructions on how to provide management comments.

(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Chief of Staff of the Army	None	1	None
Chief of Naval Operations	None	2	None
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command	3.a, 3.b, 3.c, and 3.d	None	None (U)

(U) Please provide Management Comments by June 2, 2025.

(U) Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.


INSPECTOR GENERAL
INTEGRITY
EFFICIENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

May 2, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises (Report No. DODIG-2025-091)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains recommendations that are considered unresolved because the USTRANSCOM Deputy Commander, responding on behalf of the USTRANSCOM Commander, agreed with but did not fully address three recommendations and did not agree with one recommendation. Therefore, those recommendations remain unresolved and open.

(U) Additionally, the recommendations to the Army and Navy are resolved but open. We will track these recommendations until management agrees to take actions that we determine meets the intent of the recommendations and management officials submit adequate documentation showing that all agreed-on actions are complete.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Send your response to either [redacted] if unclassified or [redacted] if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact me at [redacted]

Bryan Clark

Bryan T. Clark
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Operations

(U) Contents

(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to assess the DoD's capabilities to effectively carry out joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations and exercises.[1]

(U) In the July 8, 2024 committee report that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2025, the Senate Committee on Armed Services directed the DoD Office of Inspector General to conduct a review of the DoD's JLOTS capability.[2] Specifically, the report provided the following guidance.

> (U) The committee directs the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) to submit a report, not later than March 1, 2025, presenting findings and recommendations regarding the capability of the Department of Defense (DoD) to carry out joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations and exercises. The report must be unclassified but may include a classified annex.
>
> (U) The DOD IG report should include:
>
> (U) (1) the organizational structure used by the DoD to carry out JLOTS exercises and operations, including the responsible combatant command and participating joint services;
>
> (U) (2) a list of the governing DoD publications, including manuals, directives, and instructions, of the DoD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services, as applicable;
>
> (U) (3) a summary of all JLOTS exercises and operations conducted by U.S. Transportation Command, or any other combatant command, or carried out by the Military Services, from 2014 to 2024, including lessons learned from those exercises and operations. The summary for each exercise or operation shall include:
>
> (U) (a) the command structure;
>
> (U) (b) the participating units;
>
> (U) (c) the purpose of the use of the JLOTS;
>
> (U) (d) the capabilities of the JLOTS, including geographical and climate considerations in its deployment; and,

[1] (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the DoD as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for or requires safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

[2] (U) Senate Committee on Armed Services, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025," Report No. 118-188, July 8, 2024.

> (U) (e) an accounting of all personnel injuries and equipment loss or damage during the deployment of the JLOTS capability whether in an exercise or an operation.
>
> (U) (4) The following information specific to the deployment of the JLOTS capability to provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza in 2024:
>
> (U) (a) the preparatory planning and consideration for deploying the JLOTS capability to provide assistance to Gaza prior to the President's announcement of his decision to deploy this capability on March 7, 2024;
>
> (U) (b) whether the DoD was able to assess or control the distribution of the aid once it left DoD's possession and if not, who controlled the aid and what became of it;
>
> (U) (c) whether the DoD conducted an assessment of the threat to U.S. personnel or JLOTS equipment at the Gaza pier, and if so, what that assessment indicated;
>
> (U) (d) a list of injuries sustained and equipment damaged; and,
>
> (U) (e) lessons learned from the JLOTS deployment to Gaza.
>
> (U) (5) Any other matter the Inspector General considers appropriate.

(U) This report and its accompanying appendixes address the Committee's direction and answers the specific questions and topics the committee posed. The report discusses the DoD's overall capability to effectively execute JLOTS operations and exercises. It also discusses the organizational structure that the DoD uses to conduct JLOTS. Appendix A provides our scope and methodology, as well as a list of the DoD's relevant governing publications. Appendix B provides a summary of all JLOTS operations and exercises the DoD conducted between 2014 and 2024. This summary includes all specific information that the Committee requested on those operations and exercises. Appendix C answers the Committee's specific questions related to Operation Neptune Solace in Gaza.

(U) Background

(U) The DoD's JLOTS capability allows the DoD to deliver cargo from ship to shore in areas where fixed-port facilities are not available. The DoD recently employed JLOTS in Gaza as part of Operation Neptune Solace. Specifically, during the March 7, 2024 State of the Union address, the President announced that the U.S. military would establish a temporary JLOTS pier on the Gaza coast using DoD equipment and watercraft. The purpose of the temporary pier was to provide humanitarian aid for Palestinians in Gaza following Israel's military operations in response to the attacks on October 7, 2023.

(U) The DoD Uses Multiple Types of Equipment, Units, and Employment Methods to Conduct JLOTS

(U) According to Joint Publication (JP) 4-18, "Joint Terminal and Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations," the purpose of JLOTS is to allow the DoD to move cargo or personnel from ship to shore in areas where fixed-port facilities are damaged, unavailable, or inadequate.[3] JLOTS is one of many capabilities that the DoD maintains to provide logistics to forces deployed around the world as part of its global logistics network. According to Army and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) officials, JLOTS represents an "enabling capability" that provides land forces with logistics and sustainment support during operations on a temporary basis until those forces can secure or repair a fixed-port facility.

(U) The DoD's JLOTS Watercraft and Equipment

(U) According to JP 4-18 and Army, Navy, and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) officials, to conduct operations and exercises, the DoD employs specialized watercraft capable of maneuvering and transferring cargo and equipment in shallow waters. These watercraft provide the capability to set up temporary docks and piers onto which the watercraft can off-load the cargo. Both the Army and Navy possess similar but distinct watercraft and equipment to execute the key elements of JLOTS missions. Specifically, the Army and Navy primarily employ the following five major watercraft and pieces of equipment.

- (U) Army Landing Craft Utility 2000
- (U) Army logistics support vessel
- (U) Navy vehicle cargo ship
- (U) Modular floating docks, specifically the Army roll-on, roll-off discharge facility (RRDF) and the Navy's Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS)
- (U) Modular piers, specifically the Army Modular Causeway System (Trident Pier) and Navy's INLS

(U) See Appendix B for full descriptions and photographs of each watercraft and piece of equipment.

(U) The Army and Navy also possess additional, smaller watercraft that participate in JLOTS operations and exercises. For example, the Army uses vessels known as small tugs to assist in the movement of larger watercraft and modular causeway

[3] (U) Joint Publication 4-18, "Joint Terminal and Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations," December 5, 2022.

(U) sections. Both the Army and Navy also use warping tugs to assist in the movement or construction of their modular docks and causeways, as well as landing craft to move small amounts of cargo.

(U) The DoD's JLOTS Employment Methods

(U) The DoD typically conducts JLOTS operations or exercises in one of two ways: through "bare beach" operations or the use of the Modular Causeway System. In a bare beach JLOTS operation or exercise, Army and Navy watercraft pull up directly on the beach to offload their cargo. Bare beach operations, therefore, require specific conditions, including beach gradient (slope) and quality (lack of rocks), minimal wave conditions, and water depths sufficient to allow the watercraft to access the beach and unload their cargo.

(U) In a modular causeway JLOTS operation or exercise, Army and Navy personnel construct the Modular Causeway System that typically consists of both a modular floating dock, such as the Army's RRDF, and a modular pier, such as the Army's Trident Pier, out at sea, later connecting the pier to the beach. DoD or commercial ships then off-load cargo onto the modular floating dock out at sea, re-load the cargo onto DoD watercraft, and then off-load the cargo onto the modular pier, typically by transporting a vehicle, which rolls off the watercraft onto the pier. According to Army JLOTS personnel, the Modular Causeway System offers additional flexibility and greater throughput compared to bare beach JLOTS. Like with bare beach JLOTS, modular causeway JLOTS also requires significant planning to identify adequate beach and weather conditions. Additionally, the use of modular causeway JLOTS requires Army and Navy units and equipment to interoperate with and augment each other. Appendix B provides a more in-depth discussion of both bare beach and modular causeway JLOTS operations and exercises.

(U) The DoD's JLOTS-Capable Units

(U) The Army and Navy maintain designated units with specially trained personnel to conduct JLOTS operations and exercises. Specifically, the following units provide the DoD's bare beach and modular causeway JLOTS capabilities.

- **(U) U.S. Army 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) (7TBX):** The 7TBX is the Army's only brigade with subordinate units equipped and trained to conduct both bare beach and modular causeway JLOTS missions. In this role, the 7TBX is responsible for providing mission command and conducting expeditionary intermodal operations in support of unified land operations. The 7TBX can provide planning and management of watercraft and water terminal support for combatant command operations, as well as Army support to JLOTS planning, management, and execution.

- **(U) U.S. Navy Beach Group One (NBG-1):** The NBG-1 is the Navy's only unit with subordinate units equipped and trained to conduct both bare beach and modular causeway JLOTS missions. The NBG-1 conducts amphibious assault and JLOTS operations and provides personnel to support and operate causeways and other DoD systems used to transfer cargo from ship to shore.

(U) In addition to these units, the Army and Navy also possess several additional units capable of conducting some, but not all, JLOTS mission tasks or supporting tasks, such as cargo handling, command and control, force protection, and management of ports of embarkation. For example, the U.S. Army's 3rd Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) (3TBX) is an Army Reserve unit capable of conducting JLOTS operations, such as expeditionary terminal port management and humanitarian assistance and disaster response, but the 3TBX does not have a subordinate unit capable of performing the modular causeway mission. Additionally, the Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group contains seven Navy Cargo Handling Battalions in the Navy Reserve that support JLOTS operations by providing cargo handling services, including loading and off-loading bulk cargo.

(U) DoD Instruction 5158.06, "Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Planning and Operations"

(U) Effective employment of the DoD's JLOTS capability requires coordination across the entire DoD enterprise. The Departments of the Army and Navy organize, train, and equip the individual military forces and units capable of conducting JLOTS exercises and operations. The Military Services, including the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, conduct JLOTS exercises and operations based on planning guidance and operate as a joint force to achieve objectives. The geographic combatant commands (GCCs) create operational and contingency plans that may include JLOTS and establish joint mission-essential tasks (JMETs) identifying time frames and projected forces required for the Military Services to achieve operational objectives. The USTRANSCOM oversees and assists in executing JLOTS exercises across the DoD.

(U) Effective employment of the DoD's JLOTS capability requires coordination across the entire DoD enterprise.

(U) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5158.06, "Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) Planning and Operations," provides policies, procedures, and responsibilities on the DoD's ability to deploy and distribute personnel and supplies globally.[4] DoDI 5158.06 assigns the USTRANSCOM Commander as the

[4] (U) DoDI 5158.06, "Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) Planning and Operations," April 7, 2020.

(U) Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator (JDDC) to coordinate efforts and initiatives to reform and enhance deployment, distribution, and patient movement, including promoting capacity, interoperability, and planning across the JDDE. As the assigned JDDC, the USTRANSCOM Commander's responsibilities include promoting JLOTS capacity, interoperability, and planning across the JDDE.[5] Appendix A includes additional DoD, Army, and Navy issuances and guidance, beyond DoDI 5158.06, that are relevant to JLOTS operations and exercises.

[5] (U) In alignment with Joint Publication 3-0, "Joint Operations," for the purposes of this report, we define interoperability as the ability of Army and Navy units to coherently, effectively, and efficiently operate JLOTS equipment as a joint force without significant challenges or risk. Please see the glossary for additional details.

(U) Finding

(U) The DoD Needs to Improve Its Ability to Effectively Perform JLOTS Operations and Exercises

(U) Although the DoD completed 1 JLOTS operation and 11 JLOTS exercises between 2014 and 2024, the Army and Navy faced multiple challenges to effectively perform those operations and exercises. Specifically, we concluded that the Army and Navy did not meet Service-level standards for equipment and unit readiness to perform JLOTS operations, such as mission-capable rates for watercraft.[6] This occurred because from 2014 through 2024, the Army and Navy reduced maintenance and training resources necessary to meet mission-capable and manning standards for their JLOTS-capable units in accordance with the legal requirements of sections 7013 and 8013, title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. §7013 and §8013) to organize, train, and equip their forces.[7]

(U) We also concluded that:

- (U) the Army and Navy did not organize, train, and equip to a common joint standard, or JMET, for JLOTS operations and exercises;
- (U) Army-and Navy-specific equipment, including watercraft, piers, and causeways, as well as command, control, and communications (C3) systems was not interoperable and, as a result, suffered damage during operations and exercises, including Operation Neptune Solace in Gaza; and
- (U) the GCC and Military Service component planners did not fully consider mission-specific information requirements, such as beach conditions, average sea states, and other factors that affect the ability to successfully plan and conduct JLOTS operations.

(U) These conditions occurred because USTRANSCOM did not fully exercise its authority as the JDDC to assist in establishing joint mission standards, interoperability requirements, and minimum planning elements for JLOTS operations and exercises under DoDI 5158.06. Specifically, USTRANSCOM did not fully perform the following requirements as the JDDC for JLOTS.

- (U) Coordinate with the GCCs, Military Services, and Joint Staff to develop and implement JMETs and other performance metrics and standards to measure the capacity and resiliency of the DoD's JLOTS capabilities, even though, according to USTRANSCOM officials, they considered the need for JLOTS-specific JMETs in the past;

[6] (U) The DoD defines unit readiness as the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions. Therefore, measures of readiness include the status of manning, training, and whether a unit's available equipment can perform the assigned mission.

[7] (U) 10 U.S.C, §7013 and 10 U.S.C. §8013.

- (U) Promote joint interoperability of JLOTS equipment across the Army and Navy by identifying interoperability requirements and achieve consensus between the Services to organize, train, and equip their forces to operate jointly, such as by developing and implementing the Joint Universal Causeway Interface Module; or
- (U) Lead collaborative efforts between the GCC planners and Army and Navy subject matter experts to identify capability and readiness gaps, as well as align JLOTS planning functions and recommend sequencing of logistics actions.

(U) As a result, the DoD repeatedly encountered challenges and inefficiencies during JLOTS operations and exercises, including during Operation Neptune Solace in Gaza. The DoD also faced challenges in meeting the requirements of a fast-paced or contested environment and during simultaneous regional or global operations. One specific challenge is that the DoD's ability to successfully execute multiple JLOTS missions requiring the DoD's Modular Causeway System or Army and Navy watercraft may not be possible, or may be severely limited, based on Army and Navy manning and training, including system availability and the lack of interoperability.[8]

(U) Readiness, Training, Interoperability, and Planning Challenges Limited Effectiveness of DoD JLOTS Operations and Exercises

(U) Although the DoD completed 1 JLOTS operation and 11 JLOTS exercises between 2014 and 2024, the DoD faced readiness, training, interoperability, and planning challenges to effectively perform JLOTS operations and exercises. Specifically:

- (U) the Army and Navy did not meet Service-level standards for equipment and unit readiness to perform JLOTS operations;
- (U) the Army and Navy did not organize, train, and equip to a common joint standard, or JMET, for JLOTS operations and exercises;
- (U) Army- and Navy-specific equipment, including watercraft, piers, and causeways, as well as C3 systems, were not interoperable and, as a result, suffered damage during operations and exercises; and
- (U) the GCC and Military Service component planners did not fully consider mission-specific information requirements, such as beach conditions, average sea states, and other factors that affect the ability to successfully plan and conduct JLOTS operations and exercises.

[8] (U) Please see Appendix C for a more detailed discussion of the challenges the DoD may face.

(U) The Army and Navy Did Not Meet Service-Level Standards for Equipment and Unit Readiness and Divested JLOTS Units and Equipment

(U) The Army and Navy did not meet Service-level standards for equipment and unit readiness to perform JLOTS operations. Based on our review of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) data, and Army-and Navy-provided records, as well as interviews of Army and Navy officials, we identified that the Army and Navy faced low equipment mission-capable rates and low manning and training levels.[9] Additionally, we identified that the Army and Navy reduced JLOTS units and equipment between 2014 and 2024, with notable reductions in 2019, 2021, and 2023. These reductions left the Army and Navy with only two units capable of both bare beach and modular causeway JLOTS across the joint force.

~~(CUI)~~ We reviewed information in DRRS for the 7TBX and NBG-1, the DoD's two units capable of conducting both bare beach and modular causeway JLOTS operations and exercises. We identified readiness challenges in those units on equipment mission-capable rates, as well as manning and training. [redacted] However, DRRS does not provide detail for specific mission-capable rates of individual pieces of equipment, such as watercraft, or manning and training details. Because DRRS did not provide key details, we reviewed documentation and interviewed Army and Navy officials to identify specific readiness challenges related to the 7TBX's and NBG-1's not meeting Service-level standards for equipment mission-capable rates, manning, and training.

(U) Army and Navy JLOTS Watercraft Mission-Capable Rates Were Below Standards

~~(CUI)~~ The Army's system of record for financial management and tactical logistics, the Global Combat Support System—Army, showed that in November 2023, before Operation Neptune Solace, the Army's JLOTS watercraft fleet was [redacted]. In November 2024, following Operation Neptune Solace, the Global Combat Support System—Army showed that the watercraft fleet had dropped to [redacted].[10] The Army's standard for ground equipment mission-capable readiness is 90 percent.[11]

[9] (U) DRRS is the DoD's system of record for reporting individual military unit readiness ratings and provides the means for the Military Departments to establish a common framework for decision-making.

[10] (U) The Army did not provide an explanation for why its reported total watercraft count dropped from 73 in November 2023 to 67 in November 2024.

[11] (U) The Army establishes its required mission-capable rates in Army Regulation 700-138, "Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability," April 23, 2018.

~~(CUI)~~ Similarly, Navy officials provided data from individual Navy units for November 2024 showing that its JLOTS watercraft fleet was [redacted]. The Navy was not able to provide mission-capable rates for individual Navy JLOTS assets for November 2023 because Navy officials stated that they were not tracking that information at the time. The Navy's standard for equipment mission-capable readiness is 80 percent.[12] Figure 1 shows the Army and Navy mission-capable rates for JLOTS watercraft.

(U) Figure 1. Army and Navy JLOTS Watercraft Mission-Capable Rates

(U) Source: DoD OIG analysis of Army- and Navy-provided mission-capable rates for JLOTS watercraft.

(U) Army and Navy Units Faced Challenges Meeting Manning Requirements for JLOTS Watercraft

~~(CUI)~~ Both the 7TBX and NBG-1 also faced challenges having sufficient personnel to man their watercraft. According to 7TBX-provided documents and interviews, the battalion lacked sufficient, certified, Army mariners to meet manning requirements on some Army watercraft and struggled to keep its assigned mariners. As of January 2025, the 7TBX watercraft companies had, on average, [redacted] of assigned personnel appropriately licensed to their pay grade.[13] According to 7TBX officials, manning shortages delayed the deployment of some Army watercraft for Operation Neptune Solace. Similarly, Navy NBG-1 officials stated

[12] (U) The Navy establishes its required mission-capable rates in Navy Tactical Reference Publication, "Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy Reporting Manual," Edition February 2016.

[13] (U) Army officials stated that personnel assigned to operate Army watercraft have progressive licensing requirements based on the pay grade they hold. The officials stated that, as personnel gain experience, they must also meet new licensing and certifications requirements appropriate to their new roles.

~~(CUI)~~ that their overall manning level before deploying for Operation Neptune for units that support JLOTS was less than [redacted], and that NBG-1 had to pull together every person they could to sufficiently staff vessels in accordance with Navy requirements.

(U) The Army and Navy Reduced JLOTS Capacity by Divesting JLOTS-Capable Units and Equipment

(U) The Army and Navy recently divested JLOTS-capable units and equipment. For example, the Navy decommissioned one of its two JLOTS-capable units (Amphibious Construction Battalion Two) in 2023. Amphibious Construction Battalion Two was the only U.S. East Coast-based Navy JLOTS unit capable of both bare beach and modular causeway JLOTS operations. Additionally, the Navy deactivated a JLOTS system known as the Elevated Causeway System—Modular in 2021. This system provided the Navy with the capability to construct a more permanent and weather-resistant modular causeway. Lastly, the Army sold approximately 48 percent (64 of its 134 watercraft) between 2018 and 2019, eliminating a significant portion of the Army's total JLOTS capacity. Officials from Headquarters, Department of the Army Logistics Directorate (G-4) and the Navy's Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N-4), the 7TBX, NBG-1, and NBG-2 expressed concern at the Services' divestment of JLOTS capabilities and stated their belief that the DoD's current JLOTS capabilities were not sufficient to meet projected needs.[14]

(U) The Army sold approximately 48 percent (64 of its 134 watercraft) between 2018 and 2019.

(U) The Army and Navy Did Not Organize, Train, and Equip to a Joint Standard for JLOTS Responsibilities

(U) The Army and Navy did not organize, train, and equip their units responsible for JLOTS operations and exercises to a common joint standard, such as a JMET. The Military Services have specific responsibilities under 10 U.S.C. §7013 and §8013 to organize, train, equip, prepare, and maintain their forces. According to DoDI 7730.66, "Guidance for Defense Readiness Reporting System," METs and JMETs help support strategic analysis of the DoD's ability to execute the NDS and the National Military Strategy and are integral to the Chairman's Readiness System. The DoDI further states that combatant commands, combat support agencies, and Military Service component commands must ensure that METs and JMETs in DRRS align and integrate with operational plans and command exercises.[15]

[14] (U) Army headquarters officials also identified that the Army is currently undertaking a watercraft modernization and recapitalization effort to improve both the quantity and mission-capable rates of its watercraft. However, that effort is still in initial stages, with an estimated completion date of 2027.

[15] (U) DoDI 7730.66, "Readiness Reporting Guidance for Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)," December 10, 2024.

(U) However, the DoD did not establish JMETs for JLOTS. We reviewed DRRS for the 7TBX and NBG-1 and did not identify any JLOTS-specific JMETs or Service-level METs. Officials from the Army and Navy Service headquarters, USTRANSCOM, 7TBX, and NBG-1 all stated that they did not know of any existing JMETs for the JLOTS mission set. We analyzed the Service-specific METs in DRRS for their JLOTS units (the 7TBX and NBG-1) and found that those METs did not address JLOTS as either a Service or joint mission. Instead, the Service METs cover general categories, such as transportation support or terminal operations.

(U) According to Army and Navy officials, the lack of JMETs for JLOTS poses a challenge to the Services as they attempt to resource their JLOTS capacity. Navy officials stated that advocating for JLOTS is difficult if no joint requirement exists to execute it. Army officials from the 7TBX similarly stated that the lack of JMETs specific to JLOTS limited their unit's effectiveness and allowed the Service leadership to divert resources to other priorities.

(U) The lack of JMETs for JLOTS poses a challenge to the Services as they attempt to resource their JLOTS capacity.

(U) A Lack of Interoperability Caused Damage to Army and Navy JLOTS Equipment and Created Communications Security Risks During Operation Neptune Solace and Exercises

(U) Army and Navy JLOTS equipment, including watercraft, the Modular Causeway System, and C3 systems, were not fully interoperable during JLOTS operations and exercises, including Operation Neptune Solace in Gaza. According to after-action reports from JLOTS exercises and Operation Neptune Solace, this lack of interoperability created challenges for Army and Navy officials during JLOTS exercises. Additionally, Army officials stated that the lack of interoperability created challenges during Operation Neptune Solace, resulting in equipment damage and communications security risks.

(U) Army and Navy JLOTS Equipment Could Not Fully Interoperate During Exercises and Operation Neptune Solace

(U) Army and Navy JLOTS equipment were not fully interoperable. We reviewed 21 JLOTS exercise after-action reports and found four recommendations identifying the need to improve the interoperability of Army and Navy watercraft and modular causeway systems.[16] For example, during a JLOTS exercise in 2020, Army and Navy

[16] (U) As identified in Appendix B, the DoD conducted 11 JLOTS exercises between 2014 and 2024. Some exercises resulted in multiple after-action reports from different organizations involved in the exercise. For example, an exercise may have an after-action report written by USTRANSCOM, as well as a separate one written by the Army.

(U) personnel unsuccessfully attempted to interface the Army's Trident Pier system with the Navy's Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS). The after-action report for that exercise concluded that the systems were not interoperable.

~~(CUI)~~ Army officials stated that Operation Neptune Solace had similar interoperability challenges. Specifically, officials from the 7TBX stated that the Navy's INLS system sat higher in the water than the Army's roll-on, roll-off discharge facility (RRDF) and Trident Pier. This height mismatch damaged and warped the ramps on some of the Army's watercraft. The 7TBX officials estimated the total damage to Army JLOTS equipment during Operation Neptune Solace was approximately [redacted].[17] Similarly, officials from NBG-1 stated that Army watercraft caused damage to the Navy's INLS system by "punching a bunch of holes" in it. Figure 2 shows an example of damage to Army watercraft as a result of a lack of interoperability between Army and Navy equipment during Operation Neptune Solace.

(U) Figure 2. Damage to Army Watercraft from Operation Neptune Solace

(U) Source: 7TBX.

[17] (U) 7TBX officials did not identify the cause of damage to Army equipment, and we could not attribute a specific dollar value of damage to lack of interoperability.

(U) However, we could not fully assess challenges the DoD encountered during the planning of Operation Neptune Solace because the DoD did not provide all information we requested. Specifically, we requested information from the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff on August 9, 2024, regarding the DoD's planning for Operation Neptune Solace, before the President's announcement of the operation on March 7, 2024. However, the DoD did not provide information covering a period from early December 2023 through March 6, 2024, so we were unable to fully assess the DoD's planning processes. The DoD did not identify whether responsive information existed covering this period or additional reasons for not providing the requested documentation covering this period, aside from assertions of potential privilege information relating to White House communications and decisions.[18] For a detailed discussion of the planning for and execution of Operation Neptune Solace, please see Appendix C.

(U) Differences in Army and Navy Communications Systems Resulted in Communications Security Risks

~~(CUI)~~ Army and Navy C3 systems did not always allow secure communications during JLOTS exercises and operations. In the 21 JLOTS exercise after-action reports we reviewed, we found 20 recommendations that identified the need to improve interoperability of communications, including C3 systems for secure communication across the joint force during annual JLOTS exercises. For example, one USTRANSCOM after-action report from a 2018 JLOTS exercise identified a lack of communications between the ship and pier during initial operations. The after-action report recommended that future operations ensure a communications structure that allows information flow in real-time. Additionally, officials from the 7TBX, NBG-2, and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) stated that the C3 systems the Army and Navy used in Gaza were not interoperable. This situation was similar to the 2018 exercise after-action report we reviewed; therefore, USTRANSCOM officials identified communications challenges as early as 6 years before Operation Neptune Solace. Because of the lack of interoperable C3 systems,

(U) USTRANSCOM officials identified communications challenges as early as 6 years before Operation Neptune Solace.

[redacted]

[18] (U) The DoD Office of General Counsel advised that DoD officials could not provide information implicating deliberative and pre-decisional communications between the DoD and White House officials or any information that may involve confidential presidential communications or White House deliberations without first obtaining the consent of the Office of White House Counsel. Despite our requests, such consent was not provided.

(U) Geographic Combatant Command and Service Planners Did Not Fully Consider Mission-Specific Information Requirements to Plan and Conduct JLOTS Operations

(U) Planners in the GCCs and Service components did not fully identify or consider mission-specific requirements, such as beach conditions, average sea states, and other factors likely to affect the ability to successfully conduct a JLOTS operation. Specifically, we identified that both Operation Neptune Solace in Gaza and several planning documents from the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) lacked theater-specific information for potential JLOTS operations. Additionally, we identified 11 instances when Army, Navy, or USTRANSCOM personnel identified a lack of sufficient planning for potential future JLOTS operations in their after-action reports for annual JLOTS exercises or operations.

~~(CUI)~~ Operation Neptune Solace and USINDOPACOM plans did not contain mission-specific information necessary to successfully conduct a JLOTS operation, as outlined in Army Techniques Publication 4-15, "Army Watercraft Operations."[19] [redacted] The 7TBX officials stated that these details still were not present in planning documents as of March 2024, when the Secretary of Defense assigned the Gaza mission to the 7TBX. [redacted] During interviews, the 7TBX and NBG-2 officials stated that combatant command planners generally did not seek input from JLOTS subject matter experts in the units on the development of operational plans.

~~(CUI)~~ Our review of after-action reports of JLOTS exercises between 2014 and 2024 identified 11 recommendations when Army, Navy, or USTRANSCOM officials recommended improved JLOTS planning processes. For example, an Army after-action report from the 2020 JLOTS exercise stated that the Army did not have the needed geospatial data to support watercraft planning and operations in the littoral regions of the Pacific, [redacted]

[19] (U) Army Techniques Publication 4-15, "Army Watercraft Operations," April 2015.

[20] ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]

(U) The Army, Navy, and USTRANSCOM Did Not Fully Perform Their Respective Responsibilities to Prepare for and Execute JLOTS Operations and Exercises

(U) The Army and the Navy did not fully perform the necessary responsibilities to organize, train, equip, or plan for JLOTS operations and exercises. Additionally, USTRANSCOM did not fully exercise its coordinating authority for operations and planning as the JDDC, as required by DoDI 5158.06.

(U) The Army and Navy Reduced Resources for JLOTS Units Between 2014 and 2024

(U) The Army and Navy reduced maintenance and training resources necessary to meet mission-capable and manning standards for their JLOTS-capable units in accordance with 10 U.S.C. §7013 and §8013. The U.S.C. establishes overarching legal requirements to support national defense in the DoD and its Components, including the responsibilities of the Military Departments, GCCs, and other offices in the DoD. Specifically, 10 U.S.C. §7013 and §8013 requires the Secretaries of the Army and Navy to organize, train, and equip their personnel and fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the combatant commands.

(U) According to Army and Navy budget documentation, total resourcing for watercraft and sealift capacity of each Service decreased between FY 2014 and FY 2024. Specifically, the Army budgeted $83 million for operations and maintenance of its watercraft fleet in FY 2014. That amount decreased to $60 million in FY 2024, a decrease of approximately $23 million. Similarly, the Navy's budgeted operational and maintenance funding for sealift operations fell by approximately $69 million from FY 2014 ($137 million) to FY 2024 ($68 million). These reductions in funding for the Army and Navy watercraft and sealift programs coincided with reductions by both Services to reduce the quantity of JLOTS-capable units and equipment.

(U) Total resourcing for watercraft and sealift capacity of each Service decreased between FY 2014 and FY 2024.

(U) Officials from the Army and Navy stated that the reductions in both funding and equipment were due to a re-allocation of priorities in the Services. The officials also stated that the reductions created significant challenges for each Service's ability to meet future JLOTS requirements. For example, an Office of the Chief of Naval Operations official stated that over the last 5 to 8 years, the Navy reduced resourcing for its watercraft, which affected the Navy's ability to carry out JLOTS operations and exercises. The official also stated that the Navy absorbed a lot of risk by the divestment of Navy watercraft and the elimination

(U) of the Amphibious Construction Battalion Two. Likewise, according to Army officials, the Army reallocated its watercraft resources to pay for other programs while accepting increased risk to the Army's JLOTS requirements. Officials from NBG-1, NBG-2, and the 7TBX all expressed similar concerns specific to their units' and Service's ability to meet Service-level readiness standards and carry out JLOTS operations because of significant resourcing cuts.

(U) Therefore, in accordance with the Army's and Navy's responsibilities to organize, train, and equip their forces to meet the GCCs' needs under 10 U.S.C. §7013 and §8013, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations should conduct a review of units responsible for conducting JLOTS missions in their respective Services. The Chiefs' review should make appropriate recommendations to the respective Service Secretary on force structure, training, and equipment acquisition and maintenance to meet the Army's and the Navy's requirements to conduct JLOTS operations. At a minimum, the Chiefs' recommendations should include the development and implementation of an action plan to improve readiness to meet current manning, training, and equipment readiness standards, as well as any future JLOTS-specific JMETs developed by the GCCs.

(U) USTRANSCOM Did Not Coordinate to Develop and Implement JMETs and Other Performance Metrics or Standards for JLOTS

(U) USTRANSCOM did not fully exercise its authority as the JDDC, established by DoDI 5158.06. DoDI 5158.06 requires USTRANSCOM to develop, coordinate, and implement deployment and distribution performance metrics and standards in coordination with JDDE members, including the Military Services and combatant commanders.

(U) However, based on our review of DRRS and our interviews of Army, Navy, USINDOPACOM, and USTRANSCOM officials, we could not find any JLOTS-specific JMETs outlining the joint force responsibilities. We reviewed DRRS information for the 7TBX and NBG-1 and did not identify JMETs assigned to those units related to JLOTS. According to Army and Navy headquarters officials, USINDOPACOM planners, and USTRANSCOM officials, the DoD did not develop or implement JLOTS-specific JMETs.

(U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.02C, "Universal Joint Task List Program," establishes a universal joint task list as the authoritative library of all joint tasks required for planning and readiness reporting.[21] The instruction

[21] (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.02C, "Universal Joint Task List Program," December 19, 2022.

(U) identifies that combatant commanders should select from and align with universal joint tasks to define the essential and supporting tasks of their approved operational plans. Universal joint tasks, such as the one approved for JLOTS on March 1, 2023, become JMETs when a combatant commander applies and tailors conditions and standards to their operational plans. In the universal joint task list, the JLOTS task includes key metrics, such as time frames for mission-critical tasks but leaves further definition up to the combatant commander developing the operational plan. USTRANSCOM officials acknowledged USTRANSCOM's role and responsibility to coordinate and develop performance metrics for JLOTS and stated that they discussed the need for a JMET covering JLOTS with officials from the Services and the GCCs. However, these same USTRANSCOM officials stated that as of December 2024, no combatant commander had implemented a JMET for JLOTS.

(U) Therefore, in accordance with their responsibilities under DoDI 5158.06 to lead collaborative planning efforts to align the DoD's logistics functions, the USTRANSCOM Commander should develop and implement a plan to meet their assigned responsibilities as the JDDC for the DoD's JLOTS capabilities. At a minimum, the plan should include direction for USTRANSCOM to coordinate with the GCCs, Military Services, and Joint Staff to develop, implement, and annually refine both joint and Service-specific mission-essential task lists for the DoD's JLOTS capability.

(U) USTRANSCOM Did Not Identify Interoperability Requirements for JLOTS Equipment

(U) USTRANSCOM officials also did not identify JLOTS interoperability requirements through assessments, research, or development or achieve consensus among the Services on how to organize, train, and equip their forces to operate JLOTS watercraft or equipment jointly. DoDI 5158.06 requires USTRANSCOM, as the JDDC, to analyze, assess, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Military Departments on global deployment and distribution capability and capacity, as well as prioritized requirements for the JDDE. This also includes retention, modification, retirement, or transition of specific deployment and distribution systems.

(U) When we requested assessments that USTRANSCOM produced on JLOTS interoperability, USTRANSCOM officials did not provide any assessments, either independently or through products, such as after-action reports. Army, Navy, and USTRANSCOM officials also stated that USTRANSCOM did not play an active role in coordinating solutions to JLOTS interoperability challenges, aside from helping to troubleshoot those issues as they arose during annual JLOTS exercises. Army, Navy, and USTRANSCOM officials that we interviewed did state that USTRANSCOM

(U) sponsored and funded the development of a prototype module to allow full interoperability between the Army's RRDF and the Navy's INLS, known as the Joint Universal Causeway Interface Module, back in 2012. However, according to USTRANSCOM and Army officials, while both the Army and Navy acknowledged the usefulness of the Joint Universal Causeway Interface Module, neither Service provided resources to fund or field it, and USTRANSCOM did not further advocate for its adoption.

(U) Therefore, in accordance with their responsibilities under DoDI 5158.06 to lead collaborative planning efforts to align the DoD's logistics functions, the USTRANSCOM Commander should develop and implement a plan to meet their assigned responsibilities as the JDDC for the DoD's JLOTS capabilities. At a minimum, the plan should include direction for USTRANSCOM to conduct capabilities-based assessments, research, and development for JLOTS equipment and provide recommendations to the Military Services for retention, modification, retirement, or transition of systems to improve interoperability.

(U) USTRANSCOM Did Not Lead Efforts to Identify and Address Capability and Readiness Gaps in JLOTS Operational Planning

(U) Although USTRANSCOM hosted annual JLOTS planning conferences to discuss upcoming JLOTS exercises, USTRANSCOM officials did not work with Military Service and combatant command planners or JLOTS subject matter experts to address JLOTS operational planning deficiencies. DoDI 5158.06 requires that USTRANSCOM lead collaborative planning efforts to align logistic functions and recommend logistic action sequencing, including JLOTS and JLOTS-related activities.

(U) We found that USTRANSCOM officials did not fully coordinate planning efforts for JLOTS operations between Military Service and combatant command planners and Army and Navy JLOTS subject matter experts in the DoD's JLOTS-capable units in accordance with DoDI 5158.06. USTRANSCOM did establish a working group in 2012 to conduct annual meetings with both Service and combatant command staff. However, USTRANSCOM officials stated that they stopped holding working group meetings to reduce the amount of travel for group members. These officials also stated that those meetings focused on planning for upcoming annual exercises and not operational planning gaps and requirements. USTRANSCOM officials noted that they restarted the working group meetings in February 2024 but only discussed a JLOTS handbook and joint publication. Additionally, while

(U) USTRANSCOM officials did not fully coordinate planning efforts for JLOTS operations between Military Service and combatant command planners and Army and Navy JLOTS subject matter experts.

(U) USTRANSCOM officials stated that they provide the GCC planners with "JLOTS 101" briefings during annual outreach efforts, they acknowledged that those briefings were not comprehensive presentations aimed at providing the planners with information on conducting JLOTS planning efforts.

(U) Therefore, in accordance with their responsibilities under DoDI 5158.06 to lead collaborative planning efforts to align the DoD's logistics functions, the USTRANSCOM Commander should develop and implement a plan to meet their assigned responsibilities as the JDDC for the DoD's JLOTS capabilities. At a minimum, the plan should include direction for USTRANSCOM to reestablish and chair a JLOTS working group that meets annually to identify and address gaps by aligning JLOTS planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) functions with projected combatant command operational requirements. Membership in the working group should include representatives from the GCC planning cells, Military Service financial managers, and subject matter experts from the DoD's JLOTS–capable units. Additionally, the plan should require that USTRANSCOM provide a report to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identifying ongoing challenges or gaps related to JLOTS and recommending policies, procedures, or actions necessary to better align the DoD's capabilities with operational requirements and national defense priorities.

(U) The DoD Faces Potential Challenges in Global Operations Requiring JLOTS Capability

(U) Insufficient manning, training, and materiel readiness at the Military Service level, coupled with the lack of integration and the interoperability of JLOTS capability and capacity at the Joint level, reduced the DoD's effectiveness by repeatedly encountering known challenges and inefficiencies in JLOTS operations and exercises, including Operation Neptune Solace in Gaza. Furthermore, these conditions increased the DoD's risk to meet evolving future requirements and created challenges in fast-paced or contested environments or during simultaneous regional or global operations that require DoD JLOTS capability. Specifically, the DoD's ability to successfully execute multiple JLOTS missions requiring the DoD's Modular Causeway System or Army and Navy watercraft may not be possible or may be severely reduced based on one or more of the current limiting factors that we identified.

~~(CUI)~~ With only two active-duty units able to perform both bare beach and modular causeway JLOTS operations, the DoD may not be able to successfully execute multiple JLOTS missions simultaneously, particularly if the current readiness challenges with personnel and equipment continue in those two units.

[redacted]

~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]

For additional information on the risks to the DoD, see Appendix C.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Chief of Staff of the Army conduct a review of Army units responsible for conducting joint logistics over-the-shore missions and determine what recommendations should be made to the Secretary of the Army on force structure, training, and equipment acquisition and maintenance to meet the Army's requirement to conduct joint logistics over-the-shore. At a minimum, the Chief of Staff's recommendations should include the development and implementation of an action plan to improve the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) readiness to meet established Service manning, training, and equipment readiness standards, as well as any future joint mission essential tasks developed by the geographic combatant commands.

(U) Chief of Staff of the Army Comments

(U) The Deputy Director for Army Strategy, Plans, and Policy, responding on behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy Director stated that JLOTS is a mission set that affects several combatant commands and that the scope of any review should address and include equities from all relevant combatant commands and theater Army commands. The Deputy Director also stated that the 7TBX lessons learned should be leveraged to understand operational planning requirements. Additionally, the Deputy Director stated that the Army should examine and gain efficiencies through increased joint capability with the Navy for the mission set.

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Deputy Director addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation when the Army provides the results of its review of units responsible for conducting JLOTS, as well as its determination of what recommendations should be made to the Secretary of the Army on force structure, training, and equipment acquisition and maintenance to meet the Army's requirement to conduct JLOTS.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations conduct a review of Navy units responsible for conducting joint logistics over-the-shore missions and determine what recommendations should be made to the Secretary of the Navy on force structure, training, and equipment acquisition and maintenance to meet the Navy's requirement to conduct joint logistics over-the-shore. At a minimum, the Chief of Naval Operations' recommendations should include the development and implementation of an action plan to improve Naval Beach Group 1's readiness to meet established Service manning and equipment readiness standards, as well as any future joint mission essential tasks developed by the geographic combatant commands.

(U) Chief of Naval Operations Comments

(U) The Deputy Director of the Expeditionary Warfare Division, responding on behalf of the Chief of Naval Operations, agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy Director stated that, as part of the review, the Navy will leverage past and ongoing analyses of Naval Beach Group-required operational capabilities, consider areas to improve Naval Beach Group readiness, and examine mission essential tasks. The Deputy Director stated that although the Navy possesses Service logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) capabilities and supports JLOTS on a surge basis, the Navy's LOTS capabilities are primarily used to off-load prepositioned vessels operated by Military Sealift Command in support of the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioned Force. The Deputy Director stated that the lack of Service-specific mission essential task lists driven by a broader joint requirement limits the Navy's ability to accurately assess readiness.

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Deputy Director addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation when the Navy provides the results of its review of units responsible for conducting JLOTS, as well as its determination of what recommendations should be made to the Secretary of the Navy on force structure, training, and equipment acquisition and maintenance to meet the Navy's requirement to conduct JLOTS.

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) We recommend that the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command develop and implement a plan to meet their assigned responsibilities as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator for the DoD's joint logistics over-the-shore capabilities in accordance with DoD Instruction 5158.06, "Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Planning and Operations." At a minimum, the plan should include requirements to:

a. **(U) Coordinate with the geographic combatant commanders, Military Services, and Joint Staff to develop, implement, and annually refine both joint and Service-specific mission-essential task lists for the DoD's joint logistics over-the-shore capability.**

(U) Commander, U.S. Transportation Command Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander of USTRANSCOM, responding on behalf of the Commander, partially agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM acknowledges its responsibilities under DoD Instruction 5158.06 to lead JLOTS doctrine and oversee JLOTS exercises and training, as well as its responsibilities as the JDDC to develop, coordinate, and implement deployment and distribution performance metrics and standards. The Deputy Commander also stated that USTRANSCOM agrees that both joint and Service-specific mission essential task lists for JLOTS are needed; however, validated joint requirements are prerequisites before JMETs are applicable, and those requirements currently do not exist. The Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM's approach to address the recommendation is to engage with the Joint Staff's Logistics Functional Capabilities Board to determine the Joint Force's requirements for Service LOTS and JLOTS capability and capacity. The Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM will ask the Joint Staff to: (1) task capabilities-based assessments (CBAs) to the Services and combatant commands for them to identify minimum requirements and pacing threats, and (2) coordinate across the Services and combatant commands to align capability and capacity requirements (equipment, readiness, manpower) and align authorities and responsibilities.

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Deputy Commander did not fully address the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation remains unresolved. The Deputy Commander did not state whether they would develop and implement a plan to meet the responsibilities assigned to USTRANSCOM under DoDI 5158.06. While the Deputy Commander did identify the need for validated joint requirements to develop JMETs, the GCCs already identified joint

(U) requirements for JLOTS in their operational plans. Additionally, the Universal Joint Task List, maintained by the Joint Staff, already contains a task associated with JLOTS for the GCCs to use in the development and proposal of JLOTS-specific JMETs. Therefore, it is not clear how USTRANSCOM's proposed action will result in the creation of JMETs and Service-specific METs for JLOTS. We request that the USTRANSCOM provide comments to the final report within 30 days with the actions USTRANSCOM intends to take to develop and implement a plan to meet USTRANSCOM's responsibilities under DoDI 5158.06.

b. (U) Conduct capabilities-based assessments, research, and development for joint logistics over-the-shore equipment and provide recommendations to the Military Services for retention, modification, retirement, or transition of systems to improve interoperability.

(U) Commander, U.S. Transportation Command Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander of USTRANSCOM, responding on behalf of the Commander, partially agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM acknowledges its responsibilities under DoD Instruction 5158.06 to lead JLOTS doctrine and oversee JLOTS exercises and training, as well as its responsibilities as the JDDC to conduct, coordinate, and participate in appropriate analyses of deployment and distribution systems and provide recommendations for retention, modification, retirement, or transition of those systems. The Deputy Commander also stated that USTRANSCOM agrees with the need for JLOTS-related CBAs, research and development, and recommendations for retention, modification, retirement, or transition of systems to improve interoperability. However, the Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM believes that the Services must conduct the CBAs and determine recommendations for retention, modification, retirement, or transition of systems based on the results of those CBAs and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System processes.

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Deputy Commander did not fully address the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation remains unresolved. While the Deputy Commander agreed with the need to conduct the CBAs, research and development, and provide recommendations to the Services on the retention, modification, retirement, or transition of systems to improve interoperability, the Deputy Commander stated that these tasks were not USTRANSCOM's responsibilities. However, DoDI 5158.06 specifically identifies USTRANSCOM's responsibilities, as the JDDC, to:

- (U) "[obtain] funding for and [conduct] [the] CBAs, technology demonstrations, and research, development, testing and evaluation which promote joint interoperable processes," and
- (U) "[provide] recommendations for retention, modification, retirement, or transition of deployment and distribution systems" based on the results of analyses.

(U) Therefore, we request that the USTRANSCOM provide comments to the final report within 30 days with the actions USTRANSCOM will take to develop and implement a plan to meet USTRANSCOM's responsibilities under DoDI 5158.06 by conducting the CBAs, research, and development for JLOTS equipment and providing recommendations to the Military Services for retention, modification, retirement, or transition of systems to improve interoperability.

c. (U) Establish and chair a joint logistics over-the-shore working group that meets annually to identify and address gaps by aligning joint logistics over-the-shore planning, programming, budgeting, and execution functions with projected combatant command operational requirements. Membership in the working group should include representatives from the geographic combatant command planning cells, Military Service financial managers, and subject matter experts from the DoD's joint logistics over-the-shore–capable units.

(U) Commander, U.S. Transportation Command Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander of USTRANSCOM, responding on behalf of the Commander, partially agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM acknowledges its responsibilities under DoD Instruction 5158.06 to lead JLOTS doctrine and oversee JLOTS exercises and training, as well as its responsibilities as the JDDC to lead collaborative planning efforts to align and harmonize deployment and distribution functions. The Deputy Commander also stated that USTRANSCOM agrees that the DoD needs a JLOTS entity to identify and address gaps, as well as align JLOTS PPBE functions with operational

(U) requirements. The Deputy Commander further stated that USTRANSCOM currently possesses coordinating authority for JLOTS and chairs a working group with similar membership to this report's recommendation but that current authorities are not sufficient or effective enough to establish and validate joint requirements. The Deputy Commander stated that without the PPBE authorities and validated joint requirements, USTRANSCOM cannot compel the Services to align capacity and capabilities with the GCC requirements. Lastly, the Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM's approach is to engage the Joint Staff's Logistics Functional Capabilities Board as the designated board with appropriate authorities to identify and address gaps and to align JLOTS PPBE functions with operational requirements.

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Deputy Commander did not address the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation remains unresolved. Our recommendation does not require USTRANSCOM to have PPBE authority or to compel the Services to act. We recognize that the Services retain PPBE authority and that the GCCs retain responsibilities to plan for operational requirements involving JLOTS. Our recommendation seeks to establish a JLOTS working group or similar entity to collectively identify and collaborate to reduce gaps between JLOTS capability and validated requirements resulting from recommendation 3.a. We acknowledge that USTRANSCOM re-established a JLOTS working group focused on revising a JLOTS handbook. However, USTRANSCOM officials stated that this working group's focus is not on aligning JLOTS capabilities with validated requirements. Therefore, we request that USTRANSCOM provide comments to the final report within 30 days with the actions USTRANSCOM will take to establish and chair a JLOTS working group that meets annually to identify and address gaps by aligning JLOTS planning, programming, budgeting, and execution functions with validated joint requirements.

d. (U) Provide a report to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identifying ongoing challenges or gaps related to joint logistics over-the-shore and recommending policies, procedures, or actions necessary to better align the DoD's capabilities with operational requirements and national defense priorities.

(U) Commander, U.S. Transportation Command Comments

(U) The Deputy Commander of USTRANSCOM, responding on behalf of the Commander, disagreed with the recommendation. The Deputy Commander stated that the CBAs and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System processes should be used to identify challenges or gaps related to JLOTS and

(U) establish and validate joint requirements. The Deputy Commander also stated that the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System should identify policies, procedures, and actions necessary to better align DoD capabilities with operational requirements and national defense priorities and serve as the reporting mechanism to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy Commander also stated that USTRANSCOM's approach is to engage with the Joint Staff's Functional Capabilities Board and for the board to determine the Joint Force's requirements for both Service LOTS and JLOTS capability and capacity. Lastly, the Deputy Commander stated that USTRANSCOM would ask the Joint Staff to: (1) task the CBAs to the Services and combatant commands for them to identify minimum requirements against pacing threats, and (2) coordinate across the Services and combatant commands to align capability and capacity requirements (such as equipment, readiness, and manpower) and align authorities and responsibilities.

(U) Our Response

(U) The comments from the Deputy Commander did not address the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation remains unresolved. DoDI 5158.06 requires that the USTRANSCOM Commander to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on the prioritized requirements for the JDDE. Additionally, DoDI 5158.06 requires that the USTRANSCOM Commander, as the assigned JDDC, integrate theater security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities supporting global deployment and distribution and make priority recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Commander's response does not address how USTRANSCOM will fulfill its JDDC responsibilities with respect to JLOTS. Therefore, we request that USTRANSCOM provide comments to the final report within 30 days with the actions USTRANSCOM will take to develop and implement a plan to meet USTRANSCOM's responsibilities under DoDI 5158.06.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from August 2024 through March 2025 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation" published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) To perform this evaluation and achieve our objective, we collected and reviewed laws, policies, directives, regulations, and command-specific guidance on JLOTS. Based on our review and requests for information to the Military Services, Joint Staff, and USTRANSCOM, the following DoD governing publications relate to JLOTS, including manuals, directives, and instructions of the DoD, Joint Staff, and Military Services.

- (U) DoDI 5158.06, "Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) Planning and Operations," April 7, 2020.
- (U) DoD Directive 5100.03, "Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands," February 9, 2011 (Incorporating Change 1, September 7, 2017).
- (U) DoDI 7730.66, "Readiness Reporting Guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting System," December 10, 2024.
- (U) 10 U.S.C. §7013(b).
- (U) 10 U.S.C. §8013(c).
- (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.02C, "Universal Joint Task List Program," December 19, 2022.
- (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide 3130, "Joint Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework," April 12, 2023.
- (U) Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, "Joint Campaigns and Operations," June 18, 2022.
- (U) JP 3-02, "Amphibious Operations," January 04, 2019. (Validated January 21, 2021).
- (U) JP 3-10, "Joint Security Operations in Theater," July 25, 2019 (Validated August 6, 2021).

- (U) JP 3-34, "Joint Engineer Operations," January 6, 2016.
- (U) JP 3-35, "Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations," March 31, 2022.
- (U) JP 4-0, "Joint Logistics," July 20, 2023.
- (U) JP 4-03, "Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine," January 11, 2016.
- (U) JP 4-09, "Distribution Operations," March 4, 2019.
- (U) JP 4-18, "Joint Terminal and Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations," December 5, 2022.
- (U) JP 5-0, "Joint Planning," December 1, 2020 (Incorporating Change 1, July 1, 2024).
- (U) Army Regulation 56-4, "Distribution of Materiel and Distribution Platform Management" November 12, 2024.
- (U) Army Regulation 56-9, "Army Intratheater Watercraft Systems," October 2, 2020.
- (U) Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, "Operations," July 31, 2019.
- (U) Army Field Manual 3-34, "Engineer Operations," December 18, 2020.
- (U) Army Techniques Publication 3-34.40 (FM 3-34.400)/MCWP 3-17.7, "General Engineering," April 14, 2023.
- (U) Army Techniques Publication 3-35.1, "Army Pre-Positioned Operations," April 21, 2022.
- (U) Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, "Sustainment," July 31, 2019.
- (U) Army Techniques Publication 4-16, "Movement Control," April 25, 2022.
- (U) Army Techniques Publication 4-15, "Army Watercraft Operations," April 13, 2015.
- (U) Army Techniques Publication 4-44/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-17.7Q, "Water Support Operations," December 16, 2022.
- (U) Army Techniques Publication 4-13, "Army Expeditionary Intermodal Operations," June 21, 2023.
- (U) Army Techniques Publication 4-12, "Army Container Operations," February 12, 2021.
- (U) Marine Corps Training Circulator 4-15.51, "Marine Crewman's Handbook," December 17, 2018.
- (U) Navy Tactical Techniques and Procedures 3-02.1M/MCWP 3-31.5, "Ship-to-Shore Movement," November 2022.

- (U) Navy Tactical Techniques and Procedures 3-02.3M/MCWP 3-32, "Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations," October 2011.
- (U) Navy Tactical Techniques and Procedures 4-01.1, "Navy Advanced Base Logistics Operations," May 2007 (Updated December 4, 2024).
- (U) Naval Warfare Publication 3-02.12/MCRP 3-31.1A, "Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)," February 1997 (Updated April 24, 2024).
- (U) Naval Warfare Publication 3-02.1.4, "Defense of the Amphibious Task Force," September 2015 (Updated August 13, 2024).
- (U) Naval Warfare Publication 3-02.21, "MSC Support of Amphibious Operations," September 1989 (Updated April 24, 2024).
- (U) Naval Warfare Publication 3-10, "Navy Expeditionary Combat Forces," October 2020 (Updated September 5, 2024).
- (U) Naval Warfare Publication 4-01, "Naval Transportation," June 2022 (Updated December 4, 2024).
- (U) Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-31.7/NWP 3-62M, "Seabasing," June 2013 (Updated May 21, 2024).
- (U) Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-30, "Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control," November 1, 2023.
- (U) Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40, "Marine Corps Logistics," November 21, 2023.
- (U) Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40B, "Tactical-Level Logistics," April 4, 2018.
- (U) Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40C, "Operational-Level Logistics" April 4, 2018.
- (U) Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-10, "Marine Corps Planning Process," August 10, 2020.

(U) We obtained and reviewed JLOTS information, and conducted interviews with officials from USINDOPACOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, and the Military Services to identify the DoD's capabilities to effectively carry out JLOTS. Specifically, we:

- (U) obtained information regarding JLOTS exercises and operations the GCCs or USTRANSCOM conducted, or the Military Services carried out from 2014 to 2024, including lessons learned from those exercises and operations;
- (U) obtained information regarding the Gaza JLOTS mission, including planning and decision documents;

- (U) reviewed information in DRRS, Joint Lessons Learned Information System, and Center for Army Lessons Learned to identify DoD capabilities, challenges, and lessons learned; and
- (U) conducted site visits to USCENTCOM at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, and the 7TBX command headquarters at Fort Eustis in Newport News, Virginia, to interview personnel regarding the DoD's JLOTS capability and its deployment in Gaza for Operation Neptune Solace.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) Government Accountability Office (GAO)

(U) Report No. GAO-25-106387, "Army Watercraft Actions Needed to Optimize Small but Critical Fleet," October 2024

(U) The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that since 2018, the Army worked to restructure its watercraft force to improve readiness, prioritize modernization, and reallocate resources. The report states that by May 2019, the Army directed the partial divestment and inactivation of units, resulting in the Army selling 64 vessels and ending funding for all Army Reserve Component vessels. The GAO found that in August 2020, the Secretary of Defense certified the results of a review that acknowledged that the Army planned to revise its watercraft force structure for a small capability that is sized to one theater and concentrated in the active Army. The GAO report stated that, since FY 2020, Army watercraft readiness declined and that the Army also identified significant capability gaps in its watercraft fleet. The GAO also stated that the Army planned to address these capability gaps by acquiring new watercraft and modernizing its current fleet. However, according to the GAO report, the Army did not fully consider potential options to minimize challenges and optimize the use of its existing watercraft fleet to meet current mission requirements. Lastly, the GAO found that the Army did not address the challenges and risks from current gaps in capability.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2025-054, "Management Advisory: Review of the DoD's Roles and Responsibilities for Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor," December 17, 2024

(U) The DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) found that, despite external constraints, DoD officials were effective in facilitating the delivery of all humanitarian aid that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) requested be delivered to Gaza through the maritime corridor, which included both JLOTS along the Gaza shoreline and the Port of Ashdod, Israel. The report found that DoD officials provided maritime transportation and logistical support related to screening the aid in Cyprus before being transported to the Gaza shore or the Port. The DoD OIG did not identify indicators that DoD officials inaccurately tracked requests. The report stated that the DoD's use of JLOTS was dependent on weather conditions for the safety of personnel and equipment, which affected the availability of JLOTS. Furthermore, the report stated that the lack of humanitarian aid also affected the availability of JLOTS. The DoD OIG recommended that USCENTCOM conduct an after-action review of its effort to deliver aid to Gaza and identify lessons learned that could be applicable to future contingency planning and humanitarian aid efforts.

(U) USAID OIG

(U) Report No. E-000-24-004-M, "USAID's Gaza Response: External Factors Impaired Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance Through the JLOTS Maritime Corridor," August 27, 2024

(U) The USAID OIG found that external factors impaired USAID's efforts to distribute humanitarian assistance to Gaza though JLOTS. The report stated that the DoD's operational and security requirements took precedence in the planning to use JLOTS and that USAID and the World Food Program had to adjust their plans. The report stated that USAID relied on existing controls of risk assessments to oversee the distribution of humanitarian assistance through JLOTS. USAID did not directly monitor distribution activities in Gaza. The USAID OIG did not make any recommendations in its report because the JLOTS operation was decommissioned.

(U) Appendix B

(U) Introduction

(U) This appendix provides additional information on the DoD's JLOTS watercraft and equipment in response to congressional tasking in the Senate Armed Services Committee report for the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act. Additionally, it provides a summary and analysis of each of the DoD's JLOTS exercises and operations between 2014 and 2024, including:

- (U) command structure,
- (U) participating units,
- (U) purpose of the use of JLOTS,
- (U) capabilities of JLOTS and considerations in its deployment, and
- (U) details on personnel injuries and equipment loss or damage.

(U) The DoD's JLOTS Equipment

(U) To conduct JLOTS operations and exercises, the DoD employs specialized watercraft capable of maneuvering and transferring cargo in shallow waters and equipment designed to set up temporary docks and piers onto which the watercraft can off-load the cargo. Both the Army and Navy possess similar but distinct watercraft and equipment to execute the key elements of JLOTS missions. Specifically, the Army and Navy primarily employed the following five major watercraft and pieces of equipment.

(U) Army Landing Craft Utility 2000 (LCU): The Army's LCU provides the capability to move personnel, cargo, and equipment during JLOTS operations. The LCU provides cargo transport, inland waterways, unimproved beach landing, emergency passenger transport, 24 double-stacked 20-foot ISO container carry capacity, and 6-foot draft. It takes a crew of 12 personnel to operate.

(U) Figure 3. Army LCU

(U) Source: The DoD OIG from Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS).

(U) Army Logistics Support Vessel (LSV): The Army's LSVs provide transportation for vehicles, containers, and general cargo to remote, underdeveloped areas along coastlines and can assist in discharging and back-loading ships in roll-on/roll-off or logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) operations. The Army LSV provides worldwide and intra-theater cargo transport with an international standardization organization container-carrying capacity of 104 double-stacked, 20-foot containers. It requires a crew of 31 personnel to operate.

(U) Figure 4. Army LSV

(U) Source: The DoD OIG from DVIDS.

(U) Navy Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) Vehicle Cargo Ship: The Bob Hope-class LMSRs are sealift carriers for dry cargo. LMSRs serve a dual purpose of transporting containerized cargo and rolling stock between developed ports and pre-positioning Army stocks globally. Military Sealift Command (MSC), USTRANSCOM's Navy component command, owns and operates these ships.
One Bob Hope-class ship, the U.S. Navy Ship (USNS) Benavidez, deployed to assist with the JLOTS operation in Gaza.

(U) Figure 5. Navy LMSR

(U) Source: The DoD OIG from DVIDS.

(U) Army Roll-on/Roll-off Discharge Facility (RRDF): The Army's RRDF system is part of the Modular Causeway System and is used to interface between roll-on/roll-off ships for the rapid discharge of rolling stock. The RRDF platform provides an interface roadway between a ship's ramp and the small craft transport ferries and boats. The Navy uses a similar but differently configured modular floating causeway and ferry known as the Navy INLS to conduct JLOTS operations and exercises.

(U) Figure 6. Army RRDF



(U) Source: The DoD OIG from DVIDS.

(U) **Army Modular Causeway System:** The Army's Modular Causeway System provides movement support for cargo and equipment during intra-theater lift or JLOTS operations. The system is comprised of four pieces of equipment—a modular warping tug; RRDF; floating causeway, also known as a Trident Pier; and a causeway ferry. The system can deploy into austere locations to build the Trident Pier up to 1,200 feet in length. The Navy possesses a similar modular pier system as part of the INLS.

(U) Figure 7. Army Trident Pier

(U) Source: The DoD OIG from DVIDS.

(U) The DoD's JLOTS Operations and Exercises from 2014 Through 2024

(U) We determined that the DoD performed 1 JLOTS operation and 11 exercises between 2014 and 2024. The sole JLOTS operation was Operation Neptune Solace in Gaza from March to July 2024, in both the U.S. European Command and USCENTCOM areas of operations. Of the 11 JLOTS training exercises, the DoD conducted 4 exercises supporting USINDOPACOM, 4 exercises supporting the U.S. Northern Command, and 1 exercise each supporting USCENTCOM, the U.S. European Command, and the U.S. Southern Command.[22]

(U) Between 2014 and 2024, the DoD employed the following JLOTS capabilities in these exercises.

- (U) Joint petroleum over-the-shore (eight times)
- (U) RRDF loading and off-loading (seven times)
- (U) Bare beach landings (five times)
- (U) Trident Pier landings (four times)
- (U) Lift-on/lift-off (LoLo) JLOTS (three times)

(U) We also identified that USTRANSCOM cancelled two scheduled JLOTS exercises, JLOTS 19 and JLOTS 24, during the 2014 to 2024 period. In the case of JLOTS 19, the Army still completed its LOTS exercises through an Army joint training exercise later that same year, but it was not a USTRANSCOM-sponsored joint training exercise. USTRANSCOM officials stated that JLOTS 24 did not occur because of the need to support Operation Neptune Solace in Gaza.

(U) We reviewed after-action reports, lessons learned, and out-briefing presentations of JLOTS exercises and identified several reported challenges common across multiple exercises.

- (U) Five of the 11 JLOTS exercises experienced operational challenges because of high sea state. For example, in 2018, because of high sea state conditions, the USNS Brittin pulled into port early and did not off-load all exercise personnel and equipment. Additionally, following the JLOTS 21 exercise, USTRANSCOM recommended the integration of meteorology and oceanography officers early into the planning process to help ensure the proper consideration of weather conditions.

[22] (U) USTRANSCOM officials reported that JLOTS 2022 was a two-part exercise series supporting USAFRICOM, but not in its assigned area of responsibility. JLOTS 2022-1 consisted of working with USAFRICOM in a tabletop exercise at Vicenza, Italy, and JLOTS 2022-1 was linked to USAFRICOM's "AFRICAN LION 22," and executed as a command post exercise in April 2022.

- (U) Four of the 11 JLOTS exercises identified problems with vessel or equipment maintenance, readiness, or availability. The 2020 after-action review specifically noted watercraft maintenance shortfalls and identified the need for the Army and Navy to address reductions of JLOTS-capable equipment and personnel across the DoD. Seven of the 11 JLOTS exercises identified problems with communication. These challenges included a lack of shared knowledge between the Army and Navy participants, gaps in their systems integration, and the need for a common operating picture.
- ~~(CUI)~~ Six of the 11 JLOTS exercises experienced C3 equipment interoperability challenges. In 2021 and 2022 after-action reports, USTRANSCOM recommended improving communications capabilities [redacted]
- (U) Eight of the 11 JLOTS exercises experienced command and control issues related to planning, organization, and location of command elements during the exercises. For example, a 2022 after-action report recommended incorporating JLOTS during training scenarios for Command and General Staff College students and that all key leaders should attend the 3-day JLOTS planner's course at Coronado Navy Base. A 2022 exercise after-action report also recommended that the GCCs define future JLOTS requirements with higher fidelity in both operations plans and concept of operations plan.

(U) JLOTS Operation

(U) Operation Neptune Solace

(U) (March 8, 2024, through July 31, 2024)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 8 shows the command structure for the JLOTS Operation Neptune Solace.

(U) Figure 8. Operation Neptune Solace Task Organization



(U) Source: USCENTCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 1. Operation Neptune Solace JLOTS Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	

Army Participating Units
• 1st Theater Sustainment Command
• 13th Armored Corps Sustainment Command
• 7th TBX
  ○ 368th Seaport Operations Company
  ○ 70th Movement Control Team
  ○ 393rd Harbor Master Operation Department
  ○ 331st Transportation Company
  ○ 1099th Transportation Detachment (TD)
  ○ 504th TD
  ○ 335th TD
• 329th Composite Watercraft Company
• 86th Engineer Dive Detachment
	Navy Participating Units
	• NBG-1
	• Amphibious Construction Battalion–One
	• Assault Craft Unit–One
	• Assault Craft Unit–Two
	• Beach Master Unit–One
	• Navy Cargo Handling Battalion
	
	USTRANSCOM Participating Units
	• Military Sealift Command
	• Maritime Prepositioning Ships–Squadron Two
	• Blount Island Command Technical Assistance Advisory Teams
	
	(U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in Operation Neptune Solace: The objective was to provide humanitarian assistance delivery efforts from the maritime domain and to alleviate potential famine conditions in Gaza.

(U) Department of the Army G-43/5/7 officials reported that the purpose of employing JLOTS in Operation Neptune Solace was to establish a Trident Pier on the Gaza coast to provide a humanitarian aid corridor using JLOTS with assistance and support from Israel, Cyprus, the United Nations, and other foreign donors.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: The President directed the DoD to establish a temporary pier to provide humanitarian aid using the DoD's JLOTS capability. According to USCENTCOM, JLOTS was the most feasible option for delivery of a large volume of humanitarian aid (with an initial goal to deliver supplies to support 500,000 individuals per month for 90 days) given the logistical and political constraints of the operational situation.[23] During planning for the operation, USCENTCOM assessed several locations in

[23] (U) See DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2025-054, "Management Advisory: Review of the DoD's Roles and Responsibilities for Facilitating the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Through the Maritime Corridor," December 17, 2024.

(U) Gaza for deployment of the Trident Pier and determined appropriate locations. USCENTCOM also assessed historical weather conditions to identify favorable times when weather was likely to allow a JLOTS operation.[24] Operation Neptune Solace JLOTS capabilities included the following pieces of equipment.

- (U) Three maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) ships
- (U) Army's RRDF and Navy's INLS
- (U) One Trident Pier
- (U) Three LSVs
- (U) Three LCUs

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, USCENTCOM reported that 62 U.S. personnel suffered injuries during Operation Neptune Solace. Based on the information provided, we were not able to determine which of these 62 injuries occurred during the performance of duties or resulted off duty or from pre-existing medical conditions. Please see Appendix C for a detailed breakdown of information on injuries during Operation Neptune Solace.

~~(CUI)~~ 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: [redacted] The Navy reported damage to 27 watercraft and INLS equipment pieces totaling approximately $31 million because of repair and maintenance requirements following Operation Neptune Solace. Refer to Appendix C for details of equipment loss or damage during this operation.

[24] (U) Please see Appendix C for additional discussion regarding the capabilities and considerations for JLOTS deployment during Operation Neptune Solace.

(U) JLOTS Exercises

(U) JLOTS 2014 Exercise (Alaska Shield)

(U) (March 29, 2014, through April 05, 2014)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 9 shows the command structure of the JLOTS 2014 exercise.

(U) Figure 9. JLOTS 2014 Task Organization



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 2. JLOTS 2014 Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	

Army Participating Units
• 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command
• 7th TBX
• Task Force 11
  ○ 51st Signal Company
  ○ 73rd Transportation Company (TC)
  ○ 467th TC
  ○ 548th Transportation Detachment (TD)
  ○ 97th TC
  ○ 481st TC
  ○ 73rd TC
  ○ 467th TC
  ○ 709th TC
  ○ 73rd TC
  ○ 467th TC
  ○ 558th Floating Craft Maintenance
  ○ 175th Floating Craft Maintenance
  ○ 368th Seaport Operations Company
  ○ 612th Movement Control Team
	Army Participating Units (cont'd)
	• Inland Petroleum Distribution System 373rd Quarter Master Battalion (Expeditionary)
	• Inland Petroleum Distribution System 417th Quarter Master Company
	• Inland Petroleum Distribution System Construction Team
	
	Navy Participating Units
	• NBG-1
	• Navy Cargo Handling Battalion
	• Amphibious Construction Battalion–One
	
	USTRANSCOM Participating Units
	• Surface Deployment and Distribution Center
	• 842nd Transportation Battalion
	• MSC: Sealift Ship
	
	Coast Guard Participating Units:
	• District 17
	• Sector Anchorage: Port Security Unit 301
	(U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2014, Alaska Shield:

USTRANSCOM officials stated that the objective of the exercise was to practice delivery of humanitarian assistance and aid to a damaged and access-restricted port.

(U) USTRANSCOM and USINDOPACOM officials stated that the purpose for the use of JLOTS during the exercise was to:

- (U) conduct a Defense in Support of Civil Authority exercise using an earthquake scenario that required JLOTS to transload supplies and deliver those supplies to damaged and access restricted ports and
- (U) validate the principal of JLOTS in an austere environment as part of the JLOTS 14 exercise.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: USTRANSCOM and USINDOPACOM officials stated that JLOTS 2014, Alaska Shield, exercised the following JLOTS capabilities.

- (U) LoLo ships and cranes[25]
- (U) LoLo mobile cranes on pier
- (U) Joint petroleum over-the-shore
- (U) Port security
- (U) Joint reception activities
- (U) In-stream load activities

(U) A USTRANSCOM after-action report identified that adverse weather conditions were a consideration for the JLOTS exercise. The after-action report stated that winds were up to 30 knots with 10- to 12-foot seas, and a swift current of 5.2 knots, which required tugs to maintain ship positioning. Moreover, the roll-on, roll-off operations were only possible during high tide because the tidal range was more than 30 feet in the Port of Anchorage, Alaska.

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM did not report any injuries for this exercise.[26]

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM's exercise after-action report stated that ice flows damaged watercraft propellers, and sludge flows caused failure of seals on pumps. However, the USTRANSCOM's after-action report did not identify specific equipment with damaged seals or a cost estimate of the damaged equipment.

[25] (U) USTRANSCOM and USINDOPACOM records did not include the names of the LoLo ships and cranes for this exercise.

[26] (U) We requested that stakeholders provide information on personnel injuries that occurred during each exercise and operations for all DoD JLOTS exercises. However, USTRANSCOM, the GCCs, and the Military Services did not provide any injury information for this exercise.

(U) JLOTS 2015 Exercise (Pacific Reach)

(U) (June 29, 2015, through July 9, 2015)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 10 shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2015 exercise.

(U) Figure 10. JLOTS 2015 Task Organization



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 3. JLOTS 2015 Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	

Army Participating Units
Task Force 10
• 86th Engineer Dive Detachment
• 545th Harbor Master Operation Department
• 149th Seaport Operations Company
• 331st Transportation Company (TC)
• 464th TC
• 97th TC
• 1098th Transportation Detachment
• 73rd Floating Craft Company
• 949th Floating Craft Company
• 175/558th TC
• 24th Public Affairs Office Detachment
• Army Air Operations Group
 	
Marine Corps Participating Units
• Marines Corps Forces Pacific
• III Marine Expeditionary Force
	USTRANSCOM Participating Units
	• Surface Deployment and Distribution Center: 599th Transportation Brigade
	• MSC
	  ○ Maritime Pre-positioning Ships Squadron 3
	  ○ MSC Shore Detachment
	  ○ USNS 2nd Lt. John P. BoBo
	  ○ USNS Red Cloud
	  ○ USNS Wheeler
	  ○ Underwater Construction Team 2
	  ○ MSC Chartered Ship
	
	Other Participating Units
	• 8th Army (Army)
	• 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command
	• 1st Signal Battalion
	• 501st Sustainment Brigade
	• 498th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion
	
	(U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2015, Pacific Reach:

USTRANSCOM and USINDOPACOM officials stated that the objective of the exercise was to practice delivery of forces to the West coast of the Republic of Korea across mud flats.

(U) USTRANSCOM and USINDOPACOM officials also stated that the purpose of the use of JLOTS during the exercise was to:

- (U) test integration of Service LOTS capabilities under joint command and control and
- (U) demonstrate the ability to conduct JLOTS in less than favorable conditions of extensive mud flats and extreme tidal range.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: USTRANSCOM and USINDOPACOM officials stated that JLOTS 15, Pacific Reach exercised the following JLOTS capabilities.

- (U) RRDF loading and off-loading
- (U) Trident Pier landings
- (U) Joint petroleum over-the-shore
- (U) Joint reception center activities
- (U) Vessel off-loading

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, neither USTRANSCOM nor U.S. Forces Korea reported any injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, neither USTRANSCOM nor U.S. Forces Korea reported equipment loss or damage for this exercise. However, one U.S. Forces Korea after-action report stated that equipment pulled from an Army pre-positioned stock had preventable maintenance issues and caused delays and maintenance work loads for the crews. The report stated that the delays resulted in a compressed exercise timeline and less fidelity on equipment drawn.

(U) JLOTS 2016 Exercise (Turbo Challenge)

(U) (June 12, 2016, through June 17, 2016)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 11 shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2016 exercise.

(U) Figure 11. JLOTS 2016 Task Organization



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 4. JLOTS 2016 Participating Units

~~(CUI)~~ Participating Units	
Army Participating Units • [redacted] • [redacted] **Navy Participating Units** • ESG-3 • [redacted] • [redacted]	**USTRANSCOM Participating Units** • Surface Deployment and Distribution Center ○ [redacted] ○ [redacted] ○ [redacted] • MSC ○ [redacted] ○ [redacted] ○ [redacted] • [redacted] ~~(CUI)~~

~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2016, Turbo Challenge:

USTRANSCOM and DLA officials stated that the objectives of the exercise were to:

- (U) deliver humanitarian assistance and aid to multiple isolated locations and a damaged and access-restricted port and
- (U) improve DoD capabilities and force deployment and logistics support to the Joint Force Commander where port access is denied, inadequate, or nonexistent. JLOTS 2016 consisted of Army and Navy LOTS forces conducting LOTS operations together under a Joint Force Commander.

(U) USTRANSCOM officials also stated that the purpose for the use of JLOTS during the exercise was to:

- (U) test joint Army and Navy military assets capable of transporting essential humanitarian aid and cargo from ship to shore at inadequate or damaged ports and over bare beach and
- (U) increase recovery capability by reestablishing sealift throughput of essential cargo, equipment, and personnel to provide sustainment operations.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: USTRANSCOM officials stated that JLOTS 16, Turbo Challenge exercised the following JLOTS capabilities.

- (U) LoLo ships and cranes
- (U) LoLo barge derrick cranes to pier
- (U) Bare beach landings
- (U) Joint petroleum over-the-shore

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, neither USTRANSCOM nor the DLA reported any injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, neither USTRANSCOM nor the DLA reported equipment loss or damage for this exercise.

(U) JLOTS 2017 Exercise

(U) (April 10, 2017, through April 21, 2017)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 12 shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2017 exercise.

(U) Figure 12. JLOTS 2017 Task Organization



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 5. JLOTS 2017 Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	
Army Participating Units • 7th TBX • 10th Transportation Battalion • 92nd Engineer Dive Detachment • 149th Transportation Company (TC) • 558th TC • 1098th Medical Boat Company • 97th Heavy Boat Company • 73rd TC • 331st TC • 444th Personnel Company • 630th Life Support Area Battalion • 371st Theater Transportation Opening Element	**Navy Participating Units** • Navy Cargo Handling Battalion • Fleet Weather Center–San Diego **USTRANSCOM Participating Units** MSC • Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships with Improved Navy Lighterage System Causeway Ferries • Maritime Prepositioning Force Utility Boats • MSC Office–Korea **(U)**

(U) Note: Information provided in response to our request for participating forces did not identify the names of specific watercraft participating in this exercise.
(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2017: USTRANSCOM and DLA officials stated that the objectives of the exercise were to execute a bilateral distribution exercise, including JLOTS and joint reception staging onward movement and integration operations with U.S. and Republic of Korea maritime and landward units.

(U) USTRANSCOM and USINDOPACOM officials stated that the purpose for the use of JLOTS during the exercise was to:

- (U) coordinate combined U.S. and Republic of Korea JLOTS forces discharging combat power and sustainment over-the-shore and staging for onward movement, and
- (U) exercise the integration of Service over-the-shore logistics capabilities under joint command and control.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: USTRANSCOM personnel stated that JLOTS 17 exercised the following JLOTS capabilities.

- (U) RRDF loading and off-loading
- (U) Trident Pier landings
- (U) Bare beach landings
- (U) Joint petroleum over-the-shore

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, neither USTRANSCOM nor the DLA reported any injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM reported that a vehicle and a vessel were both damaged when transferring cargo from the RRDF to the LCU. USTRANSCOM officials reported that drivers need training and safety briefings to address the unique conditions when transferring cargo from vessel to vessel. USTRANSCOM did not report cost estimates for the damaged equipment.

(U) JLOTS 2018 Exercise

(U) (April 15, 2018, through April 27, 2018)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 13 shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2018 exercise.

(U) Figure 13. JLOTS 2018 Task Organization



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 6. JLOTS 2018 Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	
Army Participating Units • 11th Transportation Battalion (7th TBX) • 368th Seaport Operations Company • 393rd Harbormaster Operations Detachment • 511th Dive Detachment • 11th Signal Brigade	**Navy Participating Units** • Expeditionary Strike Group Three • NBG-2 • Amphibious Construction Battalion–One • Amphibious Construction Battalion–2 • Assault Craft Unit–2 • Navy Cargo Handling Battalion–1 **USTRANSCOM Participating Units** MSC: Expeditionary Port Unit 109
	(U)

(U) Note: Information provided in response to our request for participating forces did not identify the names of specific watercraft participating in this exercise.
(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2018: USTRANSCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and DLA officials stated that the objectives of the exercise were to:

- (U) enhance regional political and military relations and
- (U) practice JLOTS operations with U.S. forces in a degraded port scenario.

(U) USTRANSCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and DLA officials also stated that the purpose for the use of JLOTS during the exercise was to provide field training and evaluation of the JLOTS capability at the port of Acajutla, El Salvador.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: According to USTRANSCOM and USSOUTHCOM the DoD exercised the following capabilities.

- (U) LoLo ship and cranes
- (U) LoLo mobile cranes on pier
- (U) Instream loading and offloading
- (U) INLS causeway landings

(U) In response to our request for information, USSOUTHCOM reported a climate-related consideration during the JLOTS operations. Specifically, they reported that because of high sea states, all equipment could not be discharged instream and the USNS Brittin was forced to pull into the port.

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and the DLA did not report any injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and the DLA reported that miscommunication between several parties caused damage to a warping tug mast when a causeway piece was lowered from the vessel into the water. As part of safety discussion points in an after-action report, USTRANSCOM reported that clear delineation of who had mission command during crane operations and safety briefs addressed the variables that affected the lifts. The information provided did not report a cost estimate for the damaged warping tug.

(U) JLOTS 2020 Exercise (Native Fury)

(U) (March 8, 2020, through April 5, 2020)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 14 shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2020 exercise.

(U) Figure 14. JLOTS 2020 Task Organization



(U) Source: The DoD OIG using U.S Navy and Marine Corps after-action report information.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 7. JLOTS 2020 Participating Units

~~(CUI)~~ Participating Units	
Army Participating Units	**Navy Participating Units**
• [redacted] • • [redacted] • [redacted] • [redacted] • [redacted] • [redacted] • [redacted]	• [redacted] ○ [redacted] ○ [redacted] ○ [redacted] • [redacted] • [redacted] **USTRANSCOM Participating Units** • [redacted] ○ [redacted] ○ [redacted] ○ [redacted] ○ [redacted] • [redacted] • [redacted] ~~(CUI)~~

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2020, Native Fury: USTRANSCOM officials stated that the objective of the exercise was to practice discharge of a marine prepositioned force.

(U) USTRANSCOM and Navy officials stated that the purpose for the use of JLOTS during the exercise was to:

- (U) deploy marine pre-position force equipment in an austere location across bare beach to support the marine expeditionary force Native Fury exercise, and
- (U) exercise JLOTS capabilities with the United Arab Emirates to enhance U.S. force readiness in support of theater campaign plan objectives and enhance international relations.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: USTRANSCOM personnel stated that JLOTS 2020, Native Fury, exercised the following JLOTS capabilities.

- (U) RRDF loading and off-loading
- (U) Trident Pier landings

(U) The Navy also reported that the JLOTS forces offloaded a significant portion of the crisis response force package. A Navy after-action report identified the following weather-related considerations during the exercise.

- ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]
- ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]
- ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]
- ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]
- ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy did not report any injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, the Navy and Marine Corps after-action reports identified the following damage to JLOTS equipment or watercraft. The after-action reports we reviewed did not identify cost estimates for the reported damage.

- ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]
- ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]

- ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]
- ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]

(U) JLOTS 2021 Exercise (Defender Europe)

(U) (April 25, 2021, through May 9, 2021)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 15 shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2021 exercise.

(U) Figure 15. JLOTS 2021 Task Organization



(U) Source: The NBG-2.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 8. JLOTS 2021 Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	

Army Participating Units
• 7th TBX
  ○ 11th Transportation Battalion
  ○ 558th Floating Craft Maintenance
  ○ 331st Transportation Company
  ○ 368th Seaport Operations Company
  ○ 393rd Harbor Master Operation Department
  ○ 1099th Transportation Detachment
  ○ 335th Transportation Detachment
  ○ 86th Engineer Dive Detachment
• 44th Expeditionary Signal Battalion
• 223rd Quarter Master
• 527th Military Police
• 18th Air Support Operations Group
	Navy Participating Units
	• Expeditionary Strike Group–Two
	• NBG-2
	• Amphibious Construction Battalion–Two
	• Amphibious Construction Battalion–One
	• BMU-2
	• Assault Craft Unit–Two
	• Assault Craft Unit–One
	
	USTRANSCOM Participating Units
	• MSC
	  ○ USNS Yuma
	  ○ USNS Bob Hope
	• SDDC: 839th Transportation Battalion
	
	Partner Nation Units
	• Albanian Navy (Landward and Seaward Force Protection Units)
	• British: Hurst Point

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2021, Defender Europe: USTRANSCOM officials stated that the objective of the exercise was to demonstrate the capacity of Army and Navy LOTS forces to task organize into a joint task force (JTF) and discharge forces to an access-restricted port and bulk petroleum across a bare beach.

(U) USTRANSCOM officials also stated that the purpose for the use of JLOTS during the exercise was to discharge an infantry brigade combat team to the Port of Durres and deliver bulk petroleum over-the-shore.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: USTRANSCOM officials stated that JLOTS 2021, Defender Europe exercised the following JLOTS capabilities.

- (U) RRDF loading and off-loading
- (U) Joint petroleum over-the-shore

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM did not report any injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM reported that the following items sustained damage during the JLOTS exercise.

- (U) Several pieces of Navy and Customer equipment were damaged during cargo operations. The operations that resulted in damage were repeated with no applied Lessons Learned. The USTRANSCOM documents we reviewed did not identify a cost estimate to the reported damage.
- (U) During LoLo operations, three craft and two pieces of Amphibious Bulk Liquid Transfer System equipment were damaged because of improper lifting procedures. The USTRANSCOM documents we reviewed did not identify a cost estimate to the reported damage.
- (U) Several trailers were damaged by hitting the ramp with trailer jacks because of the ramp angle on the LSV at port. The USTRANSCOM documents we reviewed did not identify a cost estimate to the reported damage.

(U) JLOTS 2022-1 Exercise (African Lion)

(U) (April 4, 2022, through April 15, 2022)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 16 below shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2022-1 table-top exercise.

(U) Figure 16. JLOTS 2022-1 Task Organization



(U) Source: The DoD OIG based on information provided by USTRANSCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 9. JLOTS 2022-1 Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	
Army Participating Units 7th TBX **Navy Participating Units** • Amphibious Construction Battalion–One • Amphibious Construction Battalion–Two	**Participating Training Audience** • U.S. Africa Command AJ4 • U.S. Southern European Task Force–Africa • 79th Theater Sustainment Command (U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2022-1, African Lion: According to USTRANSCOM officials, the objective of this table-top exercise was to engage with USAFRICOM's Joint Logistics Enterprise staff in a continuum of learning on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of JLOTS forces and equipment sets as a force enabling option to project and sustain combat power ashore.

(U) According to USTRANSCOM officials, JLOTS was not employed during this table-top exercise. However, the exercise provided the ability to conduct a JTF planning exercise for JLOTS and review doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: Because JLOTS 2022-1, African Lion was a table-top exercise and did not include the employment of JLOTS, no capabilities or considerations were available for JLOTS deployment. However, during the exercise, a JLOTS cell provided JTF planning for the application of JLOTS in support of intra-theater distribution. A USTRANSCOM observation briefing stated that participants in the exercise accomplished the following activities.

- (U) Instructed staff on JLOTS operations
- (U) Established data points on locations and availability of LOTS forces and equipment
- (U) Identified sealift requirements, sail times and conditions needed to conduct JLOTS
- (U) Supported the Joint Logistics Enterprise sustainment planning
- (U) Discussed how a JLOTS operation could augment ship-to-shore cargo operations

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM did not report any injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM did not report any equipment loss or damage for this exercise.

(U) JLOTS 2022-2 Exercise

(U) (August 1, 2022, through August 11, 2022)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 17 shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2022-2 exercise.

(U) Figure 17. JLOTS 2022-2 Task Organization



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 10. JLOTS 2022-2 Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	

Army Participating Units
• 7th TBX
  ○ 10th Transportation Brigade
  ○ 149th Seaport Operations Company
  ○ 331st Transportation Company
• 329th Composite Watercraft Company
  ○ 504th Transportation Detachment
  ○ 335th Transportation Detachment
  ○ 359th Inland Cargo Transfer Company
  ○ 492nd Harbor Master Operation Department
  ○ 86th Engineer Dive Detachment
• 79th Theater Sustainment Command
• 3rd TBX
• 44th Expeditionary Signal Battalion
	Navy Participating Units
	• NBG-2
	• Amphibian Construction Battalion–Two
	• Assault Craft Unit–Two
	• Beach Master Unit–Two
	• Navy Cargo Handling Battalion–One
	
	USTRANSCOM Participating Units
	• Surface Deployment and Distribution Center: 597th Transportation Brigade—832nd Transportation Battalion
	• MSC
	  ○ Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron
	  ○ Expeditionary Port Unit 115

(U) Note: Information provided in response to our request for participating forces did not identify the names of specific watercraft participating in this exercise.
(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2022-2: According to USTRANSCOM officials, the objective of this exercise and purpose for the use of JLOTS during the exercise was to demonstrate the capacity of Army and Navy LOTS forces to task organize into a JTF and discharge forces and bulk fuel across a bare beach.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: USTRANSCOM officials stated that JLOTS 2022-2 exercised the following JLOTS capabilities.

- (U) RRDF loading and off-loading
- (U) Trident Pier landings
- (U) Bare beach landings
- (U) Joint petroleum over-the-shore

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM did not report any injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM did not report any equipment loss or damage for this exercise.

(U) JLOTS 2023-1 Exercise (Exercise Balikatan 23)

(U) (April 1, 2023, through April 11, 2023)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 18 shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2023-1 exercise.

(U) Figure 18. JLOTS 2023-1 Task Organization



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 11. JLOTS 2023-1 Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	
Army Participating Units • 10th Transportation Battalion • 57th Military Police Company **Navy Participating Units** • Expeditionary Strike Group–Three • NBG-1 • Amphibian Construction Battalion–One • Assault Craft Unit–One • Beach Master Unit–One • Navy Cargo Handling Battalion–One • Underwater Construction Team–Two • Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit–Five	**Marine Corps Participating Units** • 3rd Landing Support Battalion • Blount Island Command **USTRANSCOM Participating Units** • SDDC: 599th Transportation Brigade • MSC: Maritime Pre-Positioning Ship Squadrons 2 & 3 ○ USNS DAHL ○ USNS Williams **(U)**

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2023-1, Balikatan 23: USTRANSCOM and Navy officials stated that the objectives of the exercise were to demonstrate:

- (U) the ability of Army, Navy, and Philippine LOTS forces to task organize into a combined JTF and discharge forces and bulk petroleum across a bare beach and
- (U) expeditionary entry into a theater of operation from the austere east coast of Luzon Island in the Philippines.

(U) USTRANSCOM officials stated that the purpose for the use of JLOTS during this exercise was to conduct bilaterial operations utilizing a ship-to-shore deployment and distribution network in competition with advisory anti-access, area-denial efforts.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: USTRANSCOM officials stated that JLOTS 2023-1, Exercise Balikatan exercised the following JLOTS capabilities.

- (U) RRDF loading and off-loading
- (U) Bare beach landings
- (U) Joint petroleum over-the-shore

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM, the Navy, and the DLA did not report injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, the Navy reported that a Navy craft took on bad fuel, which led to a 2-day de-fueling process and refueling before continuing operations. The Navy records that we reviewed did not report a cost estimate or identify what type of craft was damaged during this exercise.

(U) JLOTS 2023-2 Exercise (Talisman Sabre 23)

(U) (July 11,2023, through August 7, 2023)

(U) 1. Command Structure: Figure 19 shows the command structure for the JLOTS 2023-2 exercise.

(U) Figure 19. JLOTS 2023-2 Task Organization



(U) Source: USTRANSCOM.

(U) 2. Participating Units:

(U) Table 12. JLOTS 2023-2 Participating Units

(U) Participating Units	
Army Participating Units • 7th TBX • 593rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command • 8th Theater Sustainment Command • 70th Movement Control Team • 119th Inland Cargo Handling Company ○ 329th Composite Watercraft Company • 331st Transportation Company • 368th Seaport Operations Company • 393rd Harbor Master Operation Department	**Navy Participating Units** • NBG-1 • Amphibian Construction Battalion–One • Navy Cargo Handling Battalion **Marine Corps Participating Units** Blount Island Command **U.S. Coast Guard** 312th Port Security Unit **USTRANSCOM Participating Units** MSC • USNS Brittin • Joint petroleum over-the-shore Amphibious Bulk Liquid Transfer System **(U)**

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) 3. Objectives and Purpose for Use of JLOTS in JLOTS 2023-2, Talisman Sabre 23: According to USTRANSCOM and Navy officials, the objectives of the exercise were to:

- (U) demonstrate capacity of Army and Navy LOTS forces to task organize into a JTF and discharge forces and bulk fuel across a bare beach and
- (U) enable intra-theater logistics support sustaining continued training of joint forcible entry exercise.

(U) According to USTRANSCOM, USINDOPACOM, and Navy officials, the purpose for the use of JLOTS during the exercise was to:

- (U) demonstrate expeditionary entry into a theater of operation from an austere location,
- (U) test the discharge of vehicles and equipment from sea to shore in harsh environments, and
- (U) conduct JLOTS with partner nations in support of joint service sustainment and to enhance strategic international partnerships.

(U) 4. Capabilities and Considerations for JLOTS Deployment: USTRANSCOM officials stated that JLOTS 2023-2, Talisman Sabre 23 exercised the following JLOTS capabilities.

- (U) RRDF loading and off-loading
- (U) Trident Pier landings
- (U) Bare beach landings
- (U) Joint petroleum over-the-shore

(U) 5.a. Personnel Injuries: In response to our request and a review or records, USTRANSCOM, USINDOPACOM, and the Navy did not report any injuries for this exercise.

(U) 5.b. Equipment Damaged or Lost: In response to our request and a review of records, USTRANSCOM, USINDOPACOM, and the Navy did not report any equipment loss or damage for this exercise.

(U) Appendix C

(U) The DoD's Planning and Execution of Operation Neptune Solace in Gaza

(U) This classified annex covers the following items that Congress specifically requested.

> (U) (4) The following information specific to the deployment of the JLOTS capability to provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza in 2024:
>
> (U) (a) the preparatory planning and consideration for deploying the JLOTS capability to provide assistance to Gaza prior to the President's announcement of his decision to deploy this capability on March 7, 2024;
>
> (U) (b) whether the DoD was able to assess or control the distribution of the aid once it left DoD's possession and if not, who controlled the aid and what became of it;
>
> (U) (c) whether the DoD conducted an assessment of the threat to U.S. personnel or JLOTS equipment at the Gaza pier, and if so, what that assessment indicated;
>
> (U) (d) a list of injuries sustained and equipment damaged; and,
>
> (U) (e) lessons learned from the JLOTS deployment to Gaza.

(U) We have provided the classified annex as a separate document to those with a specific need to know and review the information in it.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Chief of Staff of the Army

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7
400 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0400

DAMO-SS 31 March 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR DoD Inspector General 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: (U) HQDA, G-35 Response to DoDIG Draft Report: Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry Out Joint Logistics Over the Shore Operations and Exercises (Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0163)

1. (U) References: DoDIG Draft Report: Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry Out Joint Logistics Over the Shore Operations and Exercises (Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0163).

2. (U) HQDA, G-35 response to the following draft report recommendation to the Chief of Staff of the Army: "We recommend that the Chief of Staff of the Army conduct a review of Army units responsible for conducting joint logistics over-the-shore missions and determine what recommendations should be made to the Secretary of the Army on force structure, training, and equipment acquisition and maintenance to meet the Army's requirement to conduct joint logistics over-the-shore. At a minimum, the Chief of Staff's recommendations should include the development and implementation of an action plan to improve the Army's 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) readiness to meet established Service manning, training, and equipment readiness standards, as well as any future joint mission essential tasks developed by the geographic combatant commands."

a. (U) HQDA, G-35 concurs with this recommendation and provides several comments. Joint logistics over the shore is a mission set which affects several combatant commands, to include USINDOPACOM, EUCOM and CENTCOM. The scope of any reviews and recommendations should address and include equities from all relevant geographical combatant commands and theater army commands.

b. (U) Leveraging 7th Transportation Brigade lessons learned, the Army should seek to understand operational planning requirements for these units and determine what level of preparation was conducted before the operation in Israel to provide humanitarian aid. This includes site assessments, logistical planning, risk mitigation, and contingency planning.

c. (U) The Army should examine potential efficiencies to be gained through increased jointness with the Navy for this mission set. Shared personnel qualifications

1
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Chief of Staff of the Army (cont'd)

UNCLASSIFIED

DAMO-SS
SUBJECT: (U) HQDA, G-35 Response to DoDIG Draft Report: Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry Out Joint Logistics Over the Shore Operations and Exercises (Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0163)

to enhance interoperability, joint training exercises and aligned training objectives may foster a more integrated approach to JLOTS.

d. (U) Using the 7th Transportation Brigade's mission in Israel as a case study, the Army should review and update the force protection and threat mitigation requirements for these units to operate in contested environments. Additionally, the Army should seek to review and understand the expeditionary capabilities of these units. This should include equipment and personnel readiness levels prior to deployment from CONUS into the CENTCOM AoR.

e. (U) The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted]

COOKE.THOMAS.MOORE [redacted] Digitally signed by COOKE.THOMAS.MOORE [redacted] Date: 2025.03.31 [redacted]

Thomas M. Cooke
Deputy Director, U.S. Army
Strategy, Plans and Policy

2
UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Chief of Naval Operations

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION MEMO

02 Apr 2025

FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE (OPNAV N95)

FROM: [redacted], OPNAV N953

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO SIPR TASKER DON-250320-MG8D "EVALUATION OF THE DoD'S CAPABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT JOINT LOGISTICS OVER-THE-SHORE OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES

- Deliverable: Reponse to SIPR ETMS2 Tasker DON-250320-MG8D: DON Response for DoD OIG Draft Report D2024-DEV0PC-0163.000 "Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises"

- Included in this package are:
  - **DoDIG Draft Report (Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0163.000) "Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises"**
- POC: [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: Concur with comments on Recommendation #2
COORDINATION: None

D. A. CHASE

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared By: [redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Chief of Naval Operations (cont'd)

DoDIG Draft Report (Project No. D2024-DEV0PC-0163.000)

"Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises"
Dated March 2025

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations conduct a review of Navy units responsible for conducting joint logistics over-the-shore missions and determine what recommendations should be made to the Secretary of the Navy on force structure, training, and equipment acquisition and maintenance to meet the Navy's requirement to conduct joint logistics over-the-shore. At a minimum, the Chief of Naval Operations' recommendations should include the development and implementation of an action plan to improve Naval Beach Group 1's readiness to meet established Service manning and equipment readiness standards, as well as any future joint mission essential tasks developed by the geographic combatant commands.

Response Overview

Navy **concurs** with the recommendation to review the force structure, training, and equipment acquisition and maintenance processes of its units with LOTS capabilities. As part of the review, the Navy will leverage past and ongoing analysis of Naval Beach Group (NBG) required operational capabilities, consider areas to improve NBG readiness, and also look at mission essential tasks. However, it should be noted that while the Navy (as lead service in a maritime environment) does possess logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) capabilities and supports JLOTS on a surge basis, LOTS capabilities are primarily used to offload prepositioned vessels operated by Military Sealift Command (MSC) in support of the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF). The lack of a joint validated requirement creates an intermittent demand signal for the Navy to fully resource and prioritize joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) capabilities. Further, the lack of a service-specific mission essential task list (METL) driven by a broader joint requirement limits the Navy's ability to accurately assess readiness issues.

(U) Commander, U.S. Transportation Command

UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDER
508 SCOTT DRIVE
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-5357

24-Mar-2025

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: TCDC

SUBJECT: Response to DoDIG Draft Report "Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry out Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises" Dated March 2025 (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0163.000)

1. The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides management responses to recommendations 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, and 3.d found in the subject report.

2. The point of contact in this matter is [redacted] with any questions or concerns.

JERED P. HELWIG
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Commander

Attachment
USTRANSCOM Response

cc:
TCJ3
TCJ5J4
TCJA

(U) Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (cont'd)

DoDIG Draft Report (Project No. D2023-DEV0PC-0163.000)

"Evaluation of the DoD's Capabilities to Effectively Carry out Join Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations and Exercises"
Dated March 2025

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command develop and implement a plan to meet their assigned responsibilities as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator for the DoD's joint logistics over-the-shore capabilities in accordance with DoD Instruction 5158.06, "Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Planning and Operations." At a minimum, the plan should include requirements to:

a. Coordinate with the geographic combatant commanders, Military Services, and Joint Staff to develop, implement, and annually refine both joint and Service-specific mission essential task list of the DoD's joint logistics over-the-shore capability.

USTRANSCOM Response: Partial Concur. USTRANSCOM acknowledges its specific responsibilities per DoD Instruction 5158.06, paragraph 2.7.d to lead joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) doctrine and oversee JLOTS exercises and training. We also acknowledge in general, our role per DoDI 5158.06 paragraph 3.2.g. as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator (JDDC) to develop, coordinate and implement deployment and distribution performance metrics and standards in coordination with Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise members. USTRANSCOM agrees both joint and Service-specific (Army and Navy) mission essential task lists of the DoD's logistics over-the-shore capabilities (LOTS) are needed; however, both joint and Service-specific validated joint requirements are prerequisites before joint mission essential tasks are applicable and these requirements currently do not exist. USTRANSCOM's approach to rectify this absence is to engage with the Joint Staff's Logistics Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) for them to determine the Joint Force's requirement for Service LOTS and JLOTS capability and capacity. USTRANSCOM will ask Joint Staff to: (1) Task Capabilities Based Assessments (CBA) to the Services and CCMDs and for them to identify minimum requirements and pacing threats; (2) Coordinate across the Services and CCMDs to align capability and capacity requirements (equipment, readiness, manpower) and align authorities and responsibilities.

b. Conduct capabilities-based assessments, research, and development for joint logistics over-the-shore equipment and provide recommendations to the Military Services for retention, modification, retirement, or transition of systems to improve interoperability.

USTRANSCOM Response: Partial Concur. USTRANSCOM acknowledges its specific responsibilities per DoD Instruction 5158.06, paragraph 2.7.d to lead JLOTS doctrine and oversee JLOTS exercises and training. We also acknowledge in general, our role per DoDI 5158.06 paragraph 302.n(2). as the JDDC to conduct, coordinate and participate in appropriate analyses of deployment and distribution systems and provide recommendation for retention, modification, retirement or transition of deployment and distribution systems. USTRANSCOM agrees with the need for CBAs; however, USTRANSCOM believes the Services need to conduct CBAs as the initial step in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to determine the Joint Force's requirement for Services LOTS and JLOTS capability and capacity. USTRANSCOM also agrees with the potential need and value of LOTS/JLOTS research and

(U) Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (cont'd)

development (R&D) to close gaps in capabilities. Recommendations to the Services for retention, common, modification, retirement, or transition of systems to improve interoperability will come from Service led JCIDS processes and artifacts (i.e. Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)). USTRANSCOM is aware the Navy has recently funded and initiated a LOTS CBA (Navy N4 funded and Navy N95 led). USTRANSCOM is seeking the Joint Staff's Logistics FCB support to expand this CBA into a comprehensive effort in defining, developing, and implementing joint requirements.

c. Establish and chair a joint logistics over-the-shore working group that meets annually to identify and address gaps by aligning joint logistics over-the-shore planning, programming, budgeting, and execution functions with projected combatant command operational requirements. Membership in the working group should include representatives from the geographic combatant command planning cells, Military Service financial managers, and subject matter experts from the DoD's joint logistics over-the-shore capable units.

USTRANSCOM Response: Partial Concur. USTRANSCOM acknowledges its specific responsibilities per DoD Instruction 5158.06, paragraph 2.7.d to lead JLOTS doctrine and oversee JLOTS exercises and training. We also acknowledge in general, our role per DoDI 5158.06 paragraph 302.j. as the JDDC to lead collaborative planning efforts to align and harmonize deployment and distribution functions and recommend sequencing of related actions. USTRANSCOM agrees DoD needs a LOTS/JLOTS entity, whether that be one of the Services or another mechanism to identify and address gaps, and align LOTS/JLOTS Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) functions with operational requirements. USTRANSCOM currently has coordinating authority for JLOTS and chairs a working group with similar membership as mentioned, but these authorities and this approach are not sufficient nor effective to establish/validate joint requirements. Without PPBE authorities and validated joint requirements, USTRANSCOM cannot compel the Services to align capability and capacity requirements (equipment, readiness, Manpower). USTRANSCOM's approach is to engage the Joint Staff's Logistics FCB as the designated board with the appropriate authorities to identify and address gaps and align LOTS/JLOTS PPBE functions with operational requirements.

d. Provide a report to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identifying ongoing challenges or gaps related to joint logistics over-the-shore and recommending policies, procedures, or actions necessary to better align the DoD's capabilities with operational requirements and national defense priorities.

USTRANSCOM Response: Non-concur. CBAs, as the initial step in the JCIDS, should be used to identify challenges or gaps related to JLOTS and establish/validate joint requirements. Additionally, full Service JCIDS process should be used to identify policies, procedures, or actions necessary to better align the DoD's capabilities with operational requirements and national defense priorities. The JCIDS artifacts produced such as an ICD and AoA should serve as the reporting mechanism to the SECDEF and Chairman. USTRANSCOM's approach is to engage with the Joint Staff's Logistics FCB and for them to determine the Joint Force's requirement for Service LOTS and JLOTS capability and capacity. USTRANSCOM will ask Joint Staff to: Task CBAs to the Services and CCMDs and for them to identify minimum requirements and pacing threats; (2) Coordinate across the Services and CCMDs to align capability and capacity requirements (equipment, readiness, manpower) and align authorities and responsibilities.

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

CBA	Capabilities Based Assessment
DRRS	Defense Readiness Reporting System
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
INLS	Improved Navy Lighterage System
JDDC	Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator
JDDE	Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
JLOTS	Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
JMET	Joint Mission Essential Task
JP	Joint Publication
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LoLo	Lift-on/Lift-off
LOTS	Logistics Over-the-Shore
LSV	Logistics Support Vessel
MET	Mission Essential Task
MSC	Military Sealift Command
NBG	Naval Beach Group
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
RRDF	Roll-on/Roll-off Discharge Facility
TBX	Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary)
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USINDOPACOM	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
USTRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
USNS	U.S. Navy Ship

Whistleblower Protection
U.S. Department of Defense

Whistleblower Protection safeguards DoD employees against retaliation for protected disclosures that expose possible fraud, waste, and abuse in Government programs. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at www.dodig.mil/Components/Administrative-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal/ or contact the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator at Whistleblowerprotectioncoordinator@dodig.mil

For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

Legislative Affairs Division
703.604.8324

Public Affairs Division
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

www.dodig.mil

DoD Hotline
www.dodig.mil/hotline

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE | OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500
www.dodig.mil
DoD Hotline 1.800.424.9098